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2Abstract
The thesis considers economic models of family decision-making, and their application to 
intergeneradonal justice. The predictions of several previous "cooperative" models of family 
decision-making depend crucially on the outcome of failure of spouses to cooperate. The first 
part of the thesis develops a model which predicts behaviour of caring spouses who fail to 
cooperate.
The model has three distinctive features. First, caring between spouses is modelled 
using sympathy preferences. Second, transfers between spouses are made in income. Third, 
the interdependence between family members is resolved in two ways; first, assuming that 
family members have Coumot-Nash conjectures, that is, they maximize their own well-being 
taking the other family member’s behaviour as given and, second, assuming that family 
members have rational conjectures.
The model predicts how the division of income between spouses influences the. 
outcome of family decision-making. When each spouse has enough income to pay for his or 
her personal expenditures, expenditures are determined by the interaction of both spouses’ 
preferences. When one spouse is poor enough that she receives an income transfer from the 
other spouse, expenditures reflect the preferences of the wealthier spouse.
The second part of the thesis uses the model to analyze the tax treatment of the 
family. When spouses* incomes are comparatively equal, or when one spouse is dependent 
on the other, small government imposed transfers are irrelevant. However, if one spouse 
earns just enough to pay for her private consumption, income transfers between spouses have 
effects on social welfare.
The final part of the thesis considers intergenerational altruism in the "original 
position" described in Rawls* Theory of Justice. Intergenerational altruism is crucial to 
Rawls’ account of justice between generations. It is argued that, given the nature of the 
choice problem, and concern for descendants strong enough to generate positive bequests, 
Rawls’ intuition that intergenerational altruism guarantees intergenerational justice is correct 
However, if each child has two concerned parents, and the conditions for intergenerational 
justice to hold are satisfied, small redistributions of income are irrelevant This result leads 
to a re-examination of the intergenerational justice conditions and the background institutions 
for distributive justice.
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5Chapter 1
Economic Models of Family Decision-Making: A Survey
In much of modem micro-economics, the family is conspicuous by its absence. In standard 
economics text, such as Varian (1987), decisions are made by "consumers". When the family 
is mentioned, it is usually considered to act as a single unit, maximizing a single, well- 
behaved, utility function.
A justification for treating the family as a unit is given by, for example, Samuelson 
(1956, p. 10): "blood is thicker than water". Yet appealing to blood ties is not satisfying on 
theoretical grounds. First, families are composed of individuals, and there are well-known 
difficulties with aggregating individual preferences into a group preference function (Arrow, 
1963). Moreover, treating the family as a single entity violates the principle of 
methodological individualism, which states that "economic analysis always begins with the 
behavior of individuals" (Blaug, 1980, p. 49). Beginning with families is not the same.
It can be argued, in a Friedmanite spirit, that what matters is whether or not a family 
acts as if it were a single individual. But this positivist view does not imply that we can 
ignore the family. Possibly the family does act like a single individual, but we cannot 
establish whether or not it does until we compare an individually-based model of behaviour 
with a family-based model to see which best explains stylized facts about the world.
Furthermore, there are economically interesting questions which cannot be answered 
considering the family as a single unit such as: "Has increased female labour force
participation made women better off?” "Do income support programs affect marital stability?"
The need to explain such phenomena as female labour force participation worked 
together with interest in methodological individualism to create an expansion of interest in 
modelling the family.1 Leuthold’s (1968) pioneering work seeks to explain female labour 
supply. Chiappori (1989, p.3) cites methodological individualism as a motivation for his work 
"Modelling a group (even if reduced to two participants) as if it were a single individual, 
hence, should be seen as a mere holistic deviation". Leuthold and Chiappori are two 
examples of a field growing rapidly enough for Poliak (1985, p. 581) to comment "Families 
are fashionable".
But what is a family? Perhaps the key feature of die modem Western family is caring 
or altruism. Altruism or caring between family members distinguishes a family from a 
household. A household is "either one person living alone or a group of people...living...at 
the same address with common housekeeping" (OPCS, 1981). In contrast, Fishldn (1983) 
defines the family as a group whose members have (among other attributes) "a close affective 
and physical relation". A single individual or two roommates form a household but not a 
family. Altruism has traditionally been considered by economists to be of major importance 
in explaining the behaviour of the family. For example, according to Marshall (1920, p. 20), 
"[F]amily affections generally are [a] pure form of altruism". The regularity of altruistic
1 Other, less charitable explanations might be the desire to find new fields to publish in or new 
ways to manipulate major data sets.
feelings explains "the distribution of family income between its various members" and 
bequests. Altruism, in its pure and less than pure forms, is central to the economic models 
of the family which I develop in this thesis.
Two features common to many if not all families are shared living and descendants. 
The benefits of shared living enjoyed by families include consumption of goods which are 
public within the household, companionship, and economies of scale and division of labour 
in household production. Shared living benefits may be enjoyed by any family (families 
always contain at least one person), but are easiest to analyze in a two-person model, as there 
is an extensive literature on two-person decision-making, both cooperative and non- 
cooperative. Therefore agent’s decisions on labour supply or family formation when there 
exist shared living benefits are generally analyzed in models of marriage - see Becker (1981b) 
for the division of labour or Lam (1988) for public goods. The analysis generally applies, 
however, to other two-person families, for example, an elderly mother living with her 
daughter, or two siblings.
The production of and care for children or descendants is perhaps the oldest reason 
for family formation. There are numerous aspects of child bearing and rearing which are of 
economic interest, for example, fertility decisions and the population growth rate, the effect 
of the presence of children on labour force participation, and the provision of health care and 
support for the elderly (by people caring for their parents). However, we will be interested, 
in this thesis, in the convergence of children and altruism in the form of concern for 
descendants. Concern for descendants has been central to analyses of savings and the effect 
of government debt (see, for example, Barro, 1974), as well as to accounts of 
intergenerational justice (Rawls, 1971).
In subsequent chapters we first develop models of family decision making which 
incorporate altruism and shared living, and then explore concern for descendants and 
intergenerational justice. But do we need new models to explain the family? In this chapter 
we summarize the economic literature on family decision-making, highlighting the strengths 
and weaknesses of previous models, and describe the plan of the remainder of the thesis.
1.1 Survey of the Literature
In the economics literature it is possible to identify four approaches to modelling decision 
making within the family. The first, the '’cooperative" approach, assumes that the allocation 
of resources within the family is Pareto optimal. The "marriage market" approach of Becker 
(1973, 1974a, 1981b), Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977), Peters (1986) and Lam (1988) 
is cooperative, as is the "bargaining" approach of McElroy and Homey (1981) and Manser 
and Brown (1980). Lommerud (1989) develops a "voice" enforcement model, while 
Chiappori (1988,1989) generalizes the cooperative analysis. The various cooperative models 
can be distinguished, first, according to how the benefits of marriage are modelled and, 
second, according to how the division of resources within the family is determined. The 
second approach to analyzing family decision making is "non-cooperative". The key 
assumption in the non-cooperative approach is that couples are not able to negotiate binding 
agreements before marriage. Examples of the non-cooperative approach are Leuthold (1968), 
Becker (1974b, 1981a), Ashworth and Ulph (1981), Ulph (1988) and Bragstad (1989). A 
third, "institutional" approach to modelling the family is found in Apps (1981). Apps uses 
trade theory to analyze the interaction between the household production sector and the public 
production sector. A final approach is that of transactions cost economics, described by 
Cheung (1972), Ben Porath (1980) and Poliak (1985). Transaction cost economics provides
a "theory of the family" parallel to the "theory of the firm" developed by, for example, Coase 
(1937), Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Hart and Moore (1988).
1.1.1 The cooperative approach
Cooperative models can be grouped into many person bargaining or marriage market 
models and two person bargaining models, including Nash bargaining models and voice 
enforcement models. Peters (1986) is an example of the first type of "cooperative" approach. 
Partners meet in the marriage market, and decide, first, whether or not to marry and second, 
the share of total income (M) going to the wife (X) and the husband (M-X). The benefits of 
marriage are measured by comparing the couple’s total income when single with that available 
if married. Income when single is broadly defined to include "the value of potential new 
relationships". Income during marriage consists of a "valuable, though partially intangible 
output" which includes "children, love, security, companionship, money income from market 
work, and household goods from home production". It is worth stressing that the benefits of 
marriage in terms of love and companionship are not only assumed to be quantifiable, but that 
they are measured on a single scale along with money income and household goods. A 
couple will marry if total income when married is greater than total income when single, 
because it is then possible for the couple to marry and divide their increased total income in 
such a way as to make both better off than when single.
A couple must decide the share of total income when married going to each partner. 
Peters (1986) refers to Becker’s (1973,1981b) model of the marriage market to explain how 
income is divided. Becker (1973, 1981b) argues that the sharing rule is determined by the 
interaction of supply and demand in the marriage market. Supply and demand in turn reflect 
the income (defined to include love, companionship, and children) generated by marriage, the
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income available to members of each sex when single, and the supply of each sex. For 
example, an increase in the ratio of men to women increases the supply of men relative to the 
demand for men, and so "redistributes married output away from men and toward women" 
(Becker, 1981b, p. 42). It may also have indirect effects, for example, lowering the wages 
of single women2, thereby increasing the supply of women to the marriage market and 
decreasing women’s share of marital output Though possibly not relevant to OECD 
countries, it is interesting to note that the marriage market analysis, like all the other analyses 
that will be discussed here, assumes that a woman controls the property rights in herself. If 
a parent or sibling decides who (and if) a woman is to many, he may be able to extract any 
rent accruing to the woman by, for example, increasing the bride-price or decreasing the 
dowry.
A second variant of the cooperative approach considers two-person bargaining. Two- 
person bargaining models are developed in McElroy and Homey (1981) and Manser and 
Brown (1980). The papers are similar in key respects.3 For the sake of exposition, I will 
consider the McElroy and Homey paper.
In McElroy and Homey’s model, the gains from being married are given by the difference 
in utility between being married and being single:
UXx^ VXXjCx), i=raj 1.1
2With an abundance of men, employers may assume single women are likely to marry and quit 
work, hence place women in jobs requiring little training.
3 The two papers model the gains from marriage in similar ways (although Manser and Brown 
allow for public goods within the household while McElroy and Homey do not), and both use 
bargaining models, but the specific bargaining solutions used are different: McElroy and Homey only 
consider the Nash solution, while Manser and Brown consider Nash, dictatorial and Kalai- 
Smorodinsky solutions.
The term UXx) is spouse i’s utility when he is married, x=(xm^ f) is a vector specifying each 
spouse’s consumption, a  a variable indicating marital status and V(x,a) is the spouse’s utility 
if he or she were to withdraw from the marriage. The Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1953) 
predicts that the spouses divide consumption, x, so as to maximize the product of the gains 
from cooperation. Consumption is given by
arg max [Un,(x)-Vm(x,a)][Uf(x>Vf(x,a)] 1.2
The term VXx,a) acts as a "threat" or "status quo" point in that it is only the gains to marriage 
above the status quo point which are bargained over in spouse’s negotiations. The model is 
shown graphically in Figure 1.1. The curve MM represents the possible utility combinations 
when the spouses are married. The Nash bargaining solution means that, when MM is a 
straight line, the gains from staying married over and above the status quo levels are split 
50-50.
Lommerud (1989) expands the cooperative approach in two respects. First, the 
benefits from marriage in terms of the division of labour and shared household consumption 
are modelled explicitly, using a production function for household goods.4 Second, the 
allocation of income is agreed upon before marriage is entered so as to maximize a family 
welfare function which is the sum of the two spouses’ expected utilities. The resulting 
allocation is utilitarian, that is, it will be equal if people have identical utility functions, but 
may be highly unequal The novelty of Lommerud’s approach here is the notion that a
4 The production function is given by 
H=hAf(fiA) + hBf(6B)
where H is household good, A,B refer to the spouse, h1 is spouse i’s productivity coefficient, B1 the 
portion of his or her time spent in household work and f(B) a common household production function 
(Lommerud, 1989, p. 116).
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couple’s implicit maniage contract is maintained through "voice enforcement". Because each 
spouse cares what the other thinks of him or her, each carries out the original, welfare 
maximizing agreement.
F igure 1 . 1:  C ooperative b argain ing
rfU‘
IV
v"
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Considering the three cooperative approaches, that is, the marriage market approach, 
the bargaining approach, and the voice enforcement approach, it is apparent that a variety of 
Pareto optimal outcomes can emerge as the outcome of a cooperative model. Chiappori 
(1988, 1989) generalizes this insight. Instead of referring to a definite bargaining concept, 
he merely assumes that the household always reaches Pareto efficient agreements. The 
sharing of income between household members is determined by a sharing rule. Each 
household’s sharing rule can be inferred by observation of the labour supplies of household 
members (Chiappori, 1989, p. 38). The major appeal of cooperative models is that they 
predict that family decision making is Pareto efficient At the same time, however, there are 
two problems in applying certain of the cooperative models, specifically the "bargaining" and 
''marriage market" models. The first is defining the "threat point" in spouses’ negotiations. 
The second arises in justifying the assumption, made, for example, in the marriage market 
model, that spouses are able to negotiate a binding contract specifying the division of the 
gains from marriage.
In the "bargaining" and "marriage market" models, each spouse's share of marital income 
is determined, at least in part, by his or her utility when single. For example, in McElroy and 
Homey’s model, the income division maximizes the product of the two spouses* gains from 
marriage (equation 1.2). Utility when single is the "status quo" or "threat point" in reference 
to which income allocation is determined. For decisions which are made prior to marriage, 
utility when single is indeed the appropriate status quo point. Failure to reach an agreement 
results in the partners remaining single as in, for example, Becker’s marriage market For 
decisions made after marriage, however, the appropriate status quo point may not be utility 
when single. Divorce is not the inevitable result of failure to reach agreement, refusal to
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cooperate may be a more likely outcome. "Non-cooperative" models, discussed below, can 
be seen as an explanation of what happens when caring spouses fail to reach an agreement 
The observation that decisions may be made after marriage has occurred brings us to 
a more general difficulty with applying cooperative game theory to marriage. In a cooperative 
game players must be able to negotiate binding agreements about the allocation of resources; 
the presence of binding agreements is the key distinction between cooperative and 
noncooperative games (Friedman, 1986). For example, collusion in oligopoly is often 
prevented by the absence of a mechanism by which to enforce the cooperative outcome. 
There are two reasons why couples may not be able to negotiate a binding agreement before 
marriage. First, the courts generally do not (or, perhaps, cannot) intervene in the division 
of income between spouses, beyond enforcing a minimum liability to maintain, until they are 
in the process of divorcing. Second, bounded rationality and asymmetric information make 
it prohibitively costly to negotiate a long term contract specifying how each spouse should 
behave in any contingency (Poliak, 1985).
The cost of negotiating complete long-term contracts has been given as an explanation 
for the existence of firms. This literature, on "the theory of the firm", begins with Coase 
(1937), and has been developed recently by, for example, Hart and Moore (1988), and 
Grossman and Hart (1986). Both firms and families are institutions which structure complex, 
long-term relationships (Poliak, 1985, p. 583). The insights the theory of the firm literature 
offers to the understanding of families have been explored by Ben-Porath (1980) and Poliak 
(1985). This "transactions cost" approach is explored below.
The cooperative approach has intuitive appeal; it seems reasonable to believe, as 
Chiappori (1988,1989) assumes, that families reach a Pareto efficient allocation of resources.
Yet there are gaps in the cooperative story that need filling in; a task which is undertaken by 
the non-cooperative, institutional, and transactions cost approaches.
1.12 The non-cooperative approach
The non-cooperative approach explains family decisions as the outcome of each family 
member maximizing his or her own well-being, taking the other’s behaviour as given. The 
maximization is subject to constraints, namely, each spouse’s budget constraint, and a 
constraint that both spouses receive enough utility within marriage that they prefer marriage 
to divorce.
Becker (1974b, 1981a) is perhaps the best known example of the non-cooperative 
approach. In Becker’s model the household consists of two individuals; h (the altruist) and 
w (his spouse).5 The altruist’s utility function is given by:
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where Zj is spouse i's consumption of an aggregate commodity Z, and Uw is the wife’s utility 
function:
1.4
The wife is assumed to be entirely selfish.
The spouses face the budget constraints:
Zw=Iw+y 13
Zh=Ih-y 1.6
where y is the net transfer from the altruist to his spouse, and \  is spouse i’s initial income.
5 For the most part, I follow Becker’s notation, including the use of the male pronoun for the 
altruist.
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Initially, the income variable Ii is taken as fixed. With fixed initial incomes I*, the only 
decision made by either spouse is the altruist's choice of how to allocate his initial income 
Ot) into his own consumption (ZJ and the transfers to his spouse (y). The decision is made 
by the altruist so as to maximize:
Uh(Ih-y,Uw(Iw+y)) 1.7
Provided \  is high enough and I* is low enough that the altruist is at an interior solution
(y>0), the final levels of consumption (Z^^ZJ maximize the altruist’s utility function (1.7).
As Becker (1981b, p. 192) puts it, the family has a group preference function which is
"identical to that of the altruistic head". If the household maximizes a single utility function,
spouse i will not take actions which raise \  but lower ^ more, for example, taking a job in
another community, or reading in bed (when j wants to go to sleep).
Each beneficiary, no matter how selfish, would maximize the family income 
of his benefactor, and thereby would internalize all effects of his actions on 
other beneficiaries (Becker, 1981a, p. 7).
Becker call this result the "Rotten Kid Theorem".
The key to the Rotten Kid theorem is to recognize that the wife's problem is to
maximize 1.4 subject to the constraint (substituting for y in 1.5):
Zw = Iw + Ih -Z ll
In effect, the wife's income is However, suppose that the wife takes 2^ as given.
She can maximize her own income (and hence her own utility) by maximizing the total 
household income, 1*+^. This proves the Rotten Kid theorem.
Becker’s results rely on two strong hypotheses. First, maximization of the altruist’s 
utility function requires a certain distribution of income between the altruist and his spouse, 
with \  sufficiently greater than I* that the desired income transfer, y, is; positive. InBeckier's
17
terminology, the altruist must be "effectively" altruistic. If is entirely possible for a household 
to maximize h’s utility function when his income is relatively high, maximize w’s when she 
has a high income, and at other times compromise between the two. Moreover, the Rotten 
kid theorem does not tell us what happens if the poorer spouse has the option of increasing 
her income enough to gain independence, so that the richer spouse is no longer "effectively 
altruistic". Becker’s arguments, which assume effective altruism, do not hold. We need a 
more complete model to specify what might happen.
A second assumption relates to the form of support provided by the altruist Becker 
assumes that the altruist transfers income to his spouse, that the only good consumed is 
income, and that the altruist cares only about his spouse's utility. However, in a world with 
several goods it is entirely possible that the altruist's preferences over his spouse's 
consumption might differ from hers. For example, he might have imperfect knowledge of his 
wife's true preferences. While, in this case, the Rotten Kid theorem might hold, we would 
not necessarily expect the recipient spouse to spend the income transfer in complete 
accordance with the altruist's preferences, that is, the family's behaviour might not be 
perfectly described by the altruist's utility function.
Bergstrom (1989) gives a number of examples of cases where the Rotten Kid theorem 
may not hold. These arise when there is more than one commodity, for example, 
consumption now and consumption tomorrow. Bergstrom (1989, p. 1148) argues that the 
Rotten Kid theorem can be rehabilitated if conditional transferable utility is assumed and in 
certain other cases.
It is interesting to compare Becker’s results with the predictions of Arrow's (1963) 
impossibility theorem. Arrow stressed the difficulties of aggregating individual preferences
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into a social welfare function. Becker’s model is the only one discussed in this chapter which 
derives a well-behaved family preference function. However, the family preference function 
derived by Becker is, in Arrow’s terms, "dictatorial". There is one person, namely the altruist, 
whose individual preferences are always reflected in the group preference function. Arrow 
(1963) takes as axiomatic that any group preference function is not dictatorial Becker’s 
derivation of a well-behaved family preference function is, therefore, in no way inconsistent 
with the predictions of Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
Non-cooperative models of marriage which relax Becker’s assumption of effective 
altruism are developed by Leuthold (1968), Ashworth and Ulph (1981), Ulph (1988) and 
Bragstad (1989). Leuthold develops a model in which each spouse maximizes a utility 
function of the form,
Ui=Blilog(Y-Y’)+fi2ilog(Ur Li’), Z ft= l 1.8
subject to the constraint
Y=5^.u wi(T-Li)+Ri 1.9
where Ri is property income, L* leisure, Y income spent on other goods, and X*’ subsistence 
requirements of good X. The spouses share all income, so have one budget constraint. 
Income is a local public good in that each spouse’s utility depends on total family income. 
Interdependence in the spouses* optimization problems arises through income effects as each 
spouse adjusts his or her work decisions. Maximization of the utility function 1.8 yields a 
set of first order conditions which can be solved to produce labour supply functions of the 
form:
Wi=bts+bli(R/wi)+b2i(wj/wi)+b3i(l/w i) 1.10
where R represents property income, and the coefficients b  ^are defined as:
bbrdiCT-Lj’) b^l-di)
b^l-diXT-Lj*) b3i=(l-di)Y» U 1
where di=B1/(l-B2iB2j)>0.
Leuthold’s estimate of equation 1.10 is presented in Table 1.1. Her results were obtained 
using a 1962 U.S. cross-section survey of 3396 households. The sample was weighted to 
compensate for an over-representation of low income households. Wage rates were measured 
on an hourly basis; time worked in hours per year. I have not reported several dummy 
variables from the male labour supply equation; the constant b01 is for a married man with no 
children under 6.
By comparing the estimates in Table 1.1 with the interpretation of the parameters it 
can be seen that all the coefficients have the predicted sign.
Table 1.1: Leuthold’s reduced form estimates
b<K bii ba b3i
1349b -0.0063 -17.4 32.8
(90.5) (0.0047) (21.9) (7.6)
40.11 -0.2089 -244.6 600.8
(13.89) (0.0344) (37.) (38.7)
a) l=head (male) 2=spouse (female)
b) Several dummy variables are omitted. The constant term given 
is for a married man with no children under 6.
The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors.
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Table 1.2: Derived structural form estimates
Bu T-Lj* T-Ljb
i=l 0.9920 0.0080 1171 1358
i=2 0.7898 0.2102 2762 50.7
a) calculated as
b) calculated as bo/Cl-b^
It is possible to solve for the utility function parameters By, as shown in Table 1.2. 
Several points about Table 1.2 are worth noting. First, the high estimate of Bn showing a 
high preference for earnings may reflect caring between spouses, as each desires to earn 
income to contribute to household expenditures which benefit both. Second, the disparity 
between the time surplus estimates in columns 4 and 5 may be due to the low significance 
level of bn. The higher estimates implied by bn are, however, quite reasonable. Full-time 
work requires about 2000 hours per year, so one would expect time surplus to leisure 
requirements to exceed that amount. The subsistence income requirements may be estimated 
as Y’=-b31/b11=5206 or Y,=-b32/b12=2876. The higher of the two estimates is based on bn, 
which is not significant The lower of the subsistence income requirements, $2876, is 
reasonable, considering that the study uses 1962 data.
Leuthold’s research was carried out in 1968 using 1962 data. She, like Becker (1974b),
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takes a non-cooperative approach to family decision-making. However she begins with the 
premise of a common budget constraint, which leads to the prediction that the family’s 
behaviour cannot be described by maximization of one spouse’s utility function. Ashworth 
and Ulph (1981) develop a generalization of the Leuthold model of family labour supply 
which permits them to test the Leuthold specification of labour supply against the neo­
classical model
Ashworth and Ulph adopt a transcendental logarithmic function as the form of the 
utility functions for both the neo-classical and the Leuthold specification. A sample of eighty- 
eight households is used to estimate the model The sample is limited to married men whose 
wives worked more than eight hours in the week and have no children under eleven years of 
age. The budget constraint is linearized by using the net marginal wage that individuals face, 
given the hours they actually work, and adjusting the non-employment income terms to 
compensate (Ashworth and Ulph, 1981, p. 125).
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Table 1.3: Leuthold versus Neo-classical Models
Wage elasticity Total
Leuthold Income
Uncompensated Compensated Elasticity
Own wage
men -1.10 0.47 -1.47
women -4.46 -5.02 0.56
Spouse wage
men 5.05 6.41
women 0.87 1.48
Neoclassical
Own wage
men -0.03 2.17 -2.21
women -1.18 -1.14 -0.04
Spouse wage
men 1.73 1.81
women -0.16 0.75
Source: Killingsworth (1983)
Ashworth and Ulph’s findings are summarized in Table 1.3. The results presented in 
Table 13 are, for the most part, consistent with a priori expectations. For example, for men 
an increase in own wage rates causes a substitution towards more work effort, but the 
substitution effects are dominated by a larger income effect, leading to a backwards bending 
labour supply curve. The one anomalous finding is a positive compensated own wage 
elasticity for the wife in both the Leuthold model and the neo-classical model. This result 
suggests that there may be a need to improve the procedure used in estimating the models, 
a point noted by Ashworth and Ulph (1981, p. 131). However, Ashworth and Ulph’s 
empirical work supports the Leuthold model over the neo-classical model. A likelihood ratio
23
test aimed at determining which model best explains the observed data supports the Leuthold 
model at the five per cent significance level.
Despite some unexpected findings, Ashworth and Ulph’s estimates demonstrate that 
the choice of the Leuthold over the neo-classical model matters. For example, the income 
elasticity of the wife’s labour supply is positive in the Leuthold model and negative in the 
neo-classical model. As Ashworth and Ulph (1981, p. 127) point out "While we have no way 
of knowing whether these results are significantly different statistically, the policy implications 
of using one set of elasticities rather than the other are likely to be very different" The 
significance of Ashworth and Ulph’s work is that they demonstrate, first, that it is possible 
to test the neo-classical model against household models and, second, that the choice of model 
affects the estimates of income and substitution effects.
Recent work which has expanded upon the Leuthold (1968) theoretical framework 
includes Ulph (1988) and Bragstad (1989). Ulph (1988) develops a single framework within 
which Leuthold’s and Becker’s models emerge as special cases. Like Leuthold, Ulph allows 
each family member to maximize their own utility function. He departs from Leuthold, 
however, in allowing individual budget constraints. The individual budget constraints reduce 
to Leuthold’s single budget constraint if both spouses spend part of their income on the same 
commodities. The model is equivalent to Becker’s when one spouse earns enough of the 
household income to be effectively altruistic. His work has a number of parallels with the 
non-cooperative model of Chapter 2, and so I will not discuss it in detail here.
Bragstad’s (1989) model, like Leuthold’s, has individual utility functions and a 
common budget constraint. Her innovation is to introduce the concept of a threshold. In 
terms of housework, one's threshold is the point at which the kitchen/carpet/cupboard under
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the stairs becomes so dirty that one’s utility drops to zero unless some cleaning is done. Men 
and women may differ in their thresholds due to social norms. Bragstad shows that small 
differences in thresholds may give rise to large discrepancies in the amount of resources 
devoted by each individual to housework, particularly if pre-commitment is allows.
The strength of the neo-classical models is that they avoid the two weaknesses of the 
cooperative approach, that is, the possibly unrealistic assumption that spouses are able to 
negotiate binding agreements and, second, the reliance on an arbitrarily defined status quo 
point. Much of the remainder of this thesis will focus on the non-cooperative approach to 
modelling marriage. However, to put the remainder of the thesis into perspective, it is 
worthwhile to consider the remaining two approaches to modelling the family: Apps* (1981) 
"institutionar approach and Poliak’s (1985) "transactions cost” approach
1.13 The "Institutionar Approach
Apps (1981) takes an "institutional" approach to modelling intra-family income 
allocation. The approach uses a two sector trade model, as in the work of Harberger (1962). 
The two sectors may be interpreted as household production and market production (Apps, 
1981, p. 48). Trade between the sectors takes place within families. For example, a 
dependent spouse may trade household services for support The novel feature of Apps’ 
model is the introduction of institutional restrictions on mobility between the sectors which 
cause certain groups to be "crowded" in one sector of the economy. Specifically, women are 
crowded into the household production sector.
Two crucial issues are, first, how crowding is enforced and second, why it occurs. 
Crowding can be enforced by such social attitudes as "a woman’s place is in the home" or 
by legislation restricting women’s working hours and conditions. Men may have power to
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control social attitudes because, historically, their greater physical strength has given them 
greater physical power and led to the acquisition of wealth and hence political power (Apps, 
1981, p. 5). But why would men want to crowd women into the household sector? One 
reason is that crowding results in higher wages in the uncrowded sector. A second reason is 
that a man cannot easily identify his own children. "For a man to acquire own children he 
must persuade a woman to agree to a relationship, such as marriage, which is sufficiently 
monogamous for him to identify own children" (Apps, 1981, p. 54). It will be easier for men 
to persuade women to enter such a relationship if women's opportunities outside are marriage 
are limited. Accordingly, men restrict women's opportunities, and crowding occurs. Men are 
able to enforce crowding because of their greater political and economic power. They desire 
to enforce crowding to raise their incomes and produce own children.
In Apps* model the division of income within marriage is determined by the terms of 
trade between the household and market sectors of the economy, which are a function of the 
severity of crowding and the factor intensities in each sector. Crowding of women in the 
household sector lowers their wages6 (in terms of the payment for their household services) 
relative to those enjoyed by men in the uncrowded sector of the economy. There is no 
presumption of equality within the family if women are crowded and have little capital.
If women have less income than men in marriage, why do they marry? Social 
attitudes and lack of human capital limit women's opportunities outside the family (p. 50). 
Yet is seems reasonable to suppose that a competitive firm would be prepared to hire a single 
women endowed with high levels of human capital, providing that the cost of violating social
^  the short run. In the long run wage differentials are compounded by differences in the rate 
of capital accumulation.
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customs was fairly low. A second explanation is that, within the family, there are gains from 
trade. Even with crowding, the gains from trade may be sufficient to induce women to marry.
Apps* model can be thought of as putting flesh on Becker’s (1981b, 1973) model of 
the marriage market. It expands on Becker's model in two respects. First, trade between men 
and women occurs not once, as in Becker's marriage market, but on an ongoing basis. 
Second, Apps* model explains the determinants of each spouse’s reservation price in terms 
of institutional constraints. While there are difficulties in explaining why social constraints 
are not eroded by competition, Apps' model captures elements of the real world missing from 
every model discussed so far.
1.1.4 The Transaction Cost Approach
The transaction cost approach (Cheung, 1972; Ben-Porath, 1980; Poliak, 1985) has 
links with both the institutional and the non-cooperative approach. Like Apps' approach, the 
transaction cost approach focusses on institutional structures. It seeks to explain why certain 
forms of production take place within the family. Like the non-cooperative approach, it 
recognizes that couples do not order their affairs after marriage by writing a contract before 
marriage. Poliak (1985) is the most comprehensive exposition of the transaction cost 
approach, and it is on his work that I focus here. He seeks to explain, first, the advantages 
and disadvantages of the family as a production unit and, second, the nature of the marriage 
contract. I will discuss both aspects of Poliak’s theory, and contrast these with the growing 
literature of the theory of the firm.
Poliak (1985) discusses both the advantages and disadvantages of organizing 
production within the family. First, the family is able to monitor its members closely. For 
example, the family has a particular advantage in providing insurance because within family
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monitoring can overcome the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (see also 
Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981). Second, the family can offer emotional incentives or 
punishments, such as expulsion from the family, that is, it can use "voice" to enforce 
contracts, as Lommerud (1989) notes. Yet the family also has disadvantages. Emotional 
conflicts or loyalties can spill over into and disrupt economic relationships. The emotional 
punishments available to the family may be so severe that they are rarely enforced. Finally, 
the size of the family may limit the scope of family economic activity. Family size may 
prevent the realization of technologically achievable economies of scale. In the provision of 
insurance within the family, limits on the number of family members mean limits on the 
amount of risk pooling. Where technology is complex, limited family size may mean that it 
is hard to find enough family members capable of doing the job. The advantages and 
disadvantages of organizing production within the family stem from the intertwining of 
economic and emotional relationships.
Poliak’s explanation of why production takes place within families has parallels to 
Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) explanation of the emergence of firms. Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) focus on monitoring. If production is a team process, that is, each individual’s output 
cannot be directly observed, each team member will have an incentive to shirk his duties. For 
example, pushing a car is a team process, and each member of a car pushing team may be 
better off if he shirks and lets others do the pushing. Monitoring prevents firm members from 
shirking their duties. However, there is a problem with implementing monitoring, namely, 
who will monitor the monitors? Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argue that monitors themselves 
will not shirk if they "receive the residual rewards from production" (p. 782). It is the receipt
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of residual rewards, along with a number of other rights7 which defines ownership of a firm.
In families there may be one residual claimant or several8. In modem Western 
families, where much of family income is shared either directly, through gifts or transfers, or 
indirectly, through the purchase of goods consumed jointly by all family members, every 
family member is, to a greater or lesser extent, a residual claimant Each has an incentive to 
monitor the others’ performance. Monitoring will be possible to the extent that family 
members work on separate tasks while living together, hence are able to observe each other’s 
behaviour. Because every family member could monitor every other one, the power of 
families to monitor is, potentially, greater than the power of firms.9
The second part of Poliak’s (1985) theory considers the nature of the marriage 
contract. Poliak stresses that it is impossible for individuals to write a long-term marriage 
contact which specifies what actions each should take in every possible contingency. Yet 
when contracts are incomplete agents* actions in the event of uncovered contingencies must 
be negotiated under circumstances which may give one party or the other a strategic 
advantage (Poliak, 1985, p. 596). One spouse may be opportunistic, taking advantage of the 
other’s weakness. Opportunistic behaviour can be prohibited by legal rules and social
Specifically, rights to observe input (firm members’) behaviour, to be the central party common 
to all contracts, to alter membership of the firm, and to sell these rights (p. 783).
8Examples of family structures with one residual claimant are early twentieth century China 
(Cheung, 1972) or eighteenth century England (Poliak, 1985). In China, for example, the head of the 
household, the eldest male, had rights over all family members’ earnings.
Poliak (1985) recognizes that families have an advantage over firms in certain dimensions of 
monitoring. He ascribes this to loyalty. lf[F]ulfilling family obligations becomes a source of pleasure, 
pride and satisfaction, and violating them a source of guilt" (p. 556). He notes that loyalty may be 
a consequence of the particular incentive and monitoring aspects of the family.
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institutions, which treat the ongoing relationships between the parties rather than the contract 
as central (p. 596). Yet it is not obvious why in certain societies, social institutions have 
given all marital rights to men, and in other societies, husbands and wives have equal rights.
The theory of the firm makes a number of predictions about the nature of contracts 
between members of firms (see, for example, Hart and Moore, 1988). However, there are two 
reasons why their analysis cannot be applied directly to families. First, in the theory of the 
firm, the nature of a firm's assets are crucial in determining the firm's ownership structure. 
Unfortunately, a family's assets are not easily defined. It could be argued that a family’s 
assets should include, for example, its children or the fecundity of its female members. Yet 
to include people as assets is to presuppose that people can be completely controlled, that is, 
they could be slaves. Second, in the theory of the firm (as developed by Hart and Moore, 
1988), the production process in terms of the relationships between individuals' human 
capital investments, their access to assets, and their productivity are crucial in determining the 
nature of the contract between firm members. To apply the theory to the family, we need 
models of family production processes. For example, it is possible to argue that men should 
have sole rights over their children on the following grounds. A man, once conception has 
occurred, can behave opportunistically, that is, refuse to support the mother of his child during 
pregnancy. A woman cannot behave opportunistically if abortion is not available, that is, she 
must carry the fetus to term. If a man's support is indispensable to a woman during 
pregnancy, it may be efficient for him to have all rights in the child. At the same time, if a 
woman’s actions during pregnancy have effects on the fetus's health (for example, smoking
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or drinking), it may be efficient for rights in the child to be shared. The efficient allocation 
of rights will depend upon the hypothesized nature of the production process.
The transaction cost approach yields insights and generates new questions. It provides 
novel explanations of the benefits to family organization, specifically, monitoring and 
incentive advantages. It stresses the incompleteness of contracts between family members. 
Yet by stressing the importance of social institutions in structuring relationships between 
family members it raises the question: what determines the nature of social institutions? 
Turning to the theory of the firm provides no easy answers, but points to issues which need 
further consideration, specifically, the nature of a family’s assets and the production process 
within a family.
Conclusions
This chapter has surveyed four approaches used in the economics literature to 
understand the family; the cooperative, non-cooperative, institutional and transaction cost 
approaches. Models of the household can be distinguished first, according to how the division 
of resources within marriage is determined, and second, according to how the benefits of 
marriage are modelled.
In the cooperative approach, the division of resources is determined by an agreement 
reached prior to marriage. There are a variety of ways of modelling the cooperative 
agreement, ranging from Becker’s (1973, 1981b) marriage market model to McElroy and 
Homey’s (1981) Nash bargaining model and Chiappori’s (1988,1989) model, which allows 
any Pareto optimal agreement to emerge as a cooperative solution. In the noncooperative 
approach, the division of resources is determined by each spouse maximizing his or her own 
utility taking the other spouse’s behaviour as given. In Apps’ institutional approach, the
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division of resources is determined by the terms of trade between the market and household 
sectors of the economy. The transaction cost approach does not give any clear-cut predictions 
about how resources are allocated within households. However, it predicts that the rule for 
sharing household resources will influence family member’s incentives.
There are a variety of ways of modelling the benefits from family formation. The first 
is to amalgamate all the benefits of marriage into income (Becker, 1973,1974a,b, 1981a,b; 
Peters, 1986) or into a utility parameter (McElroy and Homey, 1981). The second is to 
model explicitly the household production process (Lommerud, 1989). A third approach is 
to allow income or goods to be jointly consumed by all family members (Leuthold, 1968; 
Ashworth and Ulph, 1981; Ulph, 1988, Bragstad, 1989). The first of these ways of modelling 
is used in both the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches, the second is used primarily 
in the cooperative approach, and the third primarily in the non-cooperative approach.
A fourth way of modelling the benefits from family formation is in terms of the gains 
from trade between the household and market sectors of the economy, as Apps (1981) does 
in her institutional approach. A fifth way of modelling the benefits from family formation 
is found in the transaction cost approach, especially Poliak (1985). Poliak stresses the 
family’s advantages in monitoring and incentives, and its disadvantages in terms of limited 
size.
The various models of the family have advantages and disadvantages. There are two 
issues which have not been fully resolved in the literature to date. The first is the tension 
between the reasonableness of the cooperative models’ presumption that families cooperate 
and the empirical observation that family members are unable to commit themselves to 
cooperative behaviour through binding contracts. The second issue is caring. Caring between
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spouses is modelled in a variety of ways. In Becker’s (1973, 1981b) and Peters* (1986) 
marriage market, caring is a form of income, and can be fully monetized. In Becker’s 
(1974b, 1981a) model, only one spouse, the household head, cares for the other. In Ulph 
(1988) caring is modelled in terms of joint consumption, that is, if a person cares for the 
other, he cares about her consumption. In Lommerud (1989) caring is an explanation of 
"voice" enforcement of contracts. In the transaction cost approach, emotional relationships 
are a source of the family’s monitoring and incentive advantages. However, in a number of 
these models, caring is amalgamated with, and indistinguishable from, other gains to marriage. 
Caring is not modelled explicitly. In chapter 2 we develop a model which models caring in 
a new way. First, however, we will outline the plan of the remainder of the thesis.
Outline for Chapter 2 to Chapter 5
The aim of the thesis is to develop economic models of family decision-making, and 
use the models to analyze family taxation policy and intergenerational justice. Chapter 2 
develops a model of family decision-making which incorporates caring in a new way, that is, 
using the notion of sympathy preferences. One additional distinctive feature of the model is 
that transfers between spouses are made in income. An extensive empirical literature on 
income transfers within marriage can be used to test the predictions of the model. A second 
distinctive feature is that the interdependence between family members* optimization problems 
is resolved in two ways; first, with the Coumot-Nash solution and, second, with the concept 
of rational conjectures.
The model illustrates how, when individuals retain control of their earnings, the 
division of income between spouses influences the outcome of family decision-making. At 
an "interior solution", when spouses’ incomes are comparatively equal, expenditures patterns
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are determined by the interaction of both spouses* preferences, and the equilibrium is 
unaffected by small redistributions of income. At a "no-transfers comer solution", when one 
spouse is too poor to contribute to public goods expenditures, but not poor enough to receive 
income transfers from the other spouse, income redistribution is no longer neutral. Changes 
in relative incomes change expenditure patterns. However, at the "positive transfers solution", 
when one spouse is poor enough that she receives an income transfer from the other spouse, 
expenditures reflect the preferences of the wealthier spouse.
Chapter three considers the aims for government taxation policy towards the family. 
Two issues are discussed, that is, neutrality as an aim for government policy and the treatment 
of caring between individuals in welfare analysis. As regards neutrality, it is argued that it 
is impossible for government’s treatment of the family to be neutral in every respect within 
a progressive tax system. Alternative conceptions of neutrality need to be traded off against 
each other, and against other aims for government policy, such as equity or the public interest 
The second issue discussed is the treatment of caring between individuals. Here a range of 
views, including those of Barry (1989), Dworkin (1977), Griffin (1986) and Sen (1966) are 
discussed.
The fourth chapter of the thesis considers the optimal tax treatment of the family using 
the model developed in Chapter 2. The results obtained in the chapter illuminate the 
properties of the model of family decision making. Two cases are considered: first, a linear 
income tax and, second, lump-sum taxes. In analyzing the linear income tax we find, 
somewhat surprisingly, a rationale for a higher tax rate on the second earner than has been 
suggested elsewhere in the literature. The lump-sum tax provides an illustration of the trade­
off between equity and efficiency. Equity requires that the incomes of both spouses be
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equilibrated; efficiency requires a certain amount of inequality, as that leads to an increase 
in the level of household expenditures.
The final chapter of the thesis considers inter-generational altruism and the irrelevance 
of redistribution in Rawls' original position. Chapter 2 developed the idea that, under certain 
conditions, redistribution of income between family members is irrelevant Chapter 5 argues 
that given the nature of the choice problem, and concern for descendants strong enough to 
generate positive bequests, Rawls' intuition that intergenerational altruism guarantees 
intergenerational justice is correct However, if each child has two concerned parents, and 
the conditions for intergenerational justice to hold are satisfied, income redistribution is 
irrelevant
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Chapter 2
A Non-cooperative Model of Family Decision Making
This chapter develops a two person non-cooperative model of family decision-making. As 
in Leuthold (1968) and Ulph (1988), family decision making is modelled as the outcome of 
individual, rather than household, optimization. Caring between the two individuals - the 
"spouses'* - is incorporated through "sympathy preferences"; a concept used in other contexts 
by Arrow (1963), Sen (1966), and Harsanyi (1955,1977). The interdependence between the 
spouses’ optimization problems is resolved in two ways; first, using the conventional 
Coumot-Nash solution, and second, using the concept of rational conjectures developed by 
Ulph (1980), Laitner (1980) and Bresnahan (1981).
One distinctive feature of the model is that transfers between spouses are made in income, 
which is then used to purchase commodities. The main advantage of this approach is that 
there is an extensive empirical literature on income transfers within households (see, for 
example, Pahl, 1983), which can be brought to bear on the empirical predictions of the model
The first section of the chapter sets out the spouses* optimization problems. The 
following three sections solve three variants of the model; the Coumot-Nash equilibrium
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solution, the rational conjectures equilibrium solution, and the solution when couples adopt 
a shared management system.
The first variant of the model considers a Coumot-Nash equilibrium. The model is 
similar to those of Leuthold (1968) and Ulph (1988). The differences lie in the modelling of 
individual preferences, the treatment of labour supply and public goods, and the form taken 
by transfers between spouses. The Coumot-Nash equilibrium is criticized in oligopoly 
theory on the grounds that "firms base their decisions on the assumption that their rival will 
not react to changes in their output Yet this assumption gives rise to negatively sloped 
reaction curves which falsify the underlying conjecture (Ulph, 1983, p. 131)". The same 
criticism applies in more force within a family, where individual preferences are more likely 
to be known, and responses are more easily predicted. A solution concept which avoids the 
inconsistency of the Coumot-Nash equilibrium is rational conjectures, developed in Laitner 
(1980), Ulph (1980, 1983), and Bresnahan (1981). Section 2.3 defines rational conjectures 
formally, and solves the second variant of the model, which assumes rational conjectures.
In the first two variants of the model the nature of the equilibrium is found to depend 
upon the distribution of income, including property income, between spouses. When one 
spouse is much wealthier than the other, aggregate family demands are essentially those that 
would prevail if the family maximized the wealthier spouse’s welfare, as in Becker (1974b, 
1981a,b). If the two spouses are relatively equal in income, aggregate family demands have 
certain familiar properties; specifically, they are locally independent of the distribution of 
family income between the spouses. In the intermediate case, between equality and 
substantial inequality, the distribution of income (including property income) does shape 
expenditure patterns, contrary to the predictions of the neoclassical model.
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The third variant of the model, solved in Section 2.4, describes a shared management 
system, under which all family members have equal access to household funds. Couples may 
guarantee equal access by making financial commitments, such as joint ownership of major 
assets. The predictions of the shared management model are essentially the same as those of 
the Coumot-Nash model when spouses are relatively equal.
2.1 The Model
Two spouses, the husband, h, and wife, w, maximize welfare subject to two types of 
constraints.1 Time constraints are the same in each variant of the model. Budget constraints 
vary, with individual control budget constraints holding in the first and second variant of the 
model, and a shared management budget constraint applying in the third variant
The time constraints are easily described. Each spouse i allocates a fixed amount of time, 
T, between leisure, 1^ , and market work, Wif so that:
Li+WpT 2.1
Neither spouse engages in household production. This may be thought of as the result of an 
earlier cost minimization, in which the couple found that working and buying market goods 
was cheaper than producing goods at home.2
The budget constraints summarize two pieces of information; the funds to which each 
spouse has access, and the expenditures for which he or she is responsible. In terms of
1 Although I use the terms husband and wife, the analysis applies equally to any cohabiting 
couple.
2 Such a result would require both spouses* wage rates to be high relative to their home 
productivity, the price of market substitutes for home produced goods to be relatively low, and the 
price of material inputs to home production to be relatively high.
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access, there are two possibilities; individual control and shared management Individual 
control means that each spouse has access to his or her income. Neither spouse has 
guaranteed access to his or her spouse's income. Each spouse is responsible for certain 
expenditures, and the couple may maintain a joint account for general household expenses. 
In Britain, individual control is the status quo which will prevail unless spouses commit 
themselves to another system, in as much as each partner is the direct recipient of his or her 
earnings. The alternative to individual control is shared management, under which each 
spouse has guaranteed access to all household funds. An example of a completely shared 
management system would be a couple whose earnings and all other income were paid into 
a joint bank account.
Individual control households vary according to the division of responsibility for 
household expenditures. Pahl (1983) identifies three budgeting systems which fall into my 
"individual control" category; the allowance, independent management, and whole wage 
systems.3 Under an allowance system, one earner gives the other a set allowance; each is 
responsible for specific items of household expenditure, Pi5 and his or her personal expenses, 
Qi. With an independent management system, each household member is again responsible 
for specific expenditures, but there is no set allowance. With a whole wage system, one 
partner, usually the wife, administers the couple's finances, except for the other's personal 
spending money. Both the independent management and whole wage systems are special 
cases of the allowance system. Under an independent management system, the allowance is
3 Pahl’s classification system is also used by McRae (1987). Variants of Pahl's system are used 
by Edwards (1981) and Gray (1979).
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nil. With a whole wage system, the allowance is equal to the husband's income, less his 
personal spending money.
The systems may be represented by the budget constraint:
Where R, is spouse i’s property income, wA is spouse i’s wage, 7  ^ (=-71^ ) is the net transfer 
from spouse i to spouse j, and pj and pj are the prices of P and Q respectively. Under an 
independent management system, 7ty=0. With a whole wage system, with the husband as 
primary earner, PiPh=0, and 7thw=whWh-p2Qh. In this context a transfer of income is taken to 
mean a transfer of decision making as well as a transfer of funds. The recipient completely 
controls the money transferred to him or her. So, for example, a transfer of thirty pounds 
accompanied by a bill for that amount is not a genuine transfer; one spouse is executing die 
other's purchase decisions. A transfer should be distinguished from a "housekeeping 
allowance" part of which may be allocated to specific expenditures the magnitude of which 
is decided by the husband (examples might be the husband's shirts or car repairs).
Under a shared management system, the couple pools all income. Both partners have 
access to and responsibility for the common pooL The budget constraint with shared 
management system is given by:
Budget constraint 2.3 is the sum of the two individual control budget constraints (i=h,w in 
equation 2.2).
Each spouse has a utility function, U\ which depends upon the aggregate level of 
household expenditures (P=Pi+Pj), his personal expenditure (Q*), and leisure (Lj):
Ri+WiW^jPj+pjQi-HC, 2.2
J^ wJ,(Ri+wiWi-p,Pi-p2Qi)=0 23
2.4
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Household expenditures are expenditures on commodities such as housing or, possibly, 
children,4 and private expenditures are expenditures on goods such as clothing or hobbies. 
The formulation 2.4 requires that household expenditures represent pure public goods and 
personal expenditures are purely private. The division between public and private goods is, 
in practice, not clear-cut (an individual might derive utility from having a well-dressed spouse, 
say), but the distinction will be useful throughout this analysis.
Caring between spouses is incorporated using sympathy preferences. An individual’s 
sympathy preferences are described by a welfare function, W\ which depends both on his 
utility, U\ and the utility of his spouse, Uj. The caring or sympathy, s^ , that family member 
i feels for family member j, determines the weight given to j ’s utility in i’s welfare function: 
Wi=SjS^ Uj(P,QjJLj), l^s^O , Sii=l 2.5
In this formulation, only family members enter into an individual’s welfare function. I take 
die welfare function, rather than the utility function, as the individual’s objective function.
Welfare maximization requires that each spouse know the other’s preferences. Certain 
ordinal preferences are revealed by spouses through consumption decisions. In order to 
misrepresent his preferences, a deceiver must consume a non-optimal consumption bundle, 
and therefore suffer a loss in welfare. The limitation to this preference revelation argument 
is that spouse i may have difficulty distinguishing between spouse j ’s preference for public 
goods and j ’s sympathy, s^ , as spouse j may purchase public goods because he derives utility 
from his own consumption, or because his welfare is increased by his spouse’s consumption 
of public goods.
tak in g  the view that children are, essentially, consumer durables.
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For the welfare functions to be well-defined, each spouse must be able to compare her 
own and her spouse’s utility. A change in the units in which one utility function is measured 
will change the equilibrium, as it will change the weight placed on that utility function 
relative to the other in each individual’s welfare function. However, a change in either zero 
point will not change the equilibrium. There are two justifications which may be given for 
assuming comparability of utility functions. First, as noted above, spouses have many 
opportunities to observe each other’s preferences. Interpersonal comparisons between spouses 
are more plausible than the interpersonal utility comparisons between unrelated individuals 
which occur in Harsanyi (1977), for example. Secondly, utility comparisons are unavoidable 
in any model in which the interdependence of the utility of family members is recognized as 
in, for example, Becker (1981a).
The additive formulation of the welfare function assumes that one spouse’s utility is 
independent of the other’s consumption choices. There is no complementarity between 
spouses* leisure or consumption. The additive formulation also requires that spouses are 
indifferent to the degree of utility inequality between spouses. If Wi=Ui+Uj, i’s welfare is the 
same whether the division of utilities is (10,90) or (50,50). However, there will be a 
preference for income equality if the spouses have concave utility functions. The spouses’ 
attitude towards inequality is embodied in the cardinalizarion of the utility function.
Throughout much of this chapter, I assume a Stone-Geary welfare function:
Wi= ^ a[Blklog(P-P’)+iyog(Qk-Qk’)+B3klog(Lk-Lk’)], 2 ^ = 1  2.6
where xi’ is individual i’s requirement of good x. Both spouses are assumed to have the same 
public goods consumption requirements, to simplify the calculation of demand functions. The
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individual’s problem is to maximize his or her welfare function, subject to the time and 
budget constraints. The predictions reached about the outcome of family decision making 
using the Coumot-Nash equilibrium concept hold whenever the equilibrium exists and is 
unique. The rational conjectures analysis, however, requires use of a specific functional form 
for calculation of conjectures.
2.2 Individual Optimization: Coumot-Nash Solution
This section describes the Coumot-Nash equilibrium solution to the spouses’ optimization 
problems. The first part of the section describes interior solutions; the second, comer 
solutions. The spouses are assumed to adopt an individual control management system 
(shared management is discussed in Section 2.4). Initially inter-spouse transfers are 
constrained to zero, as in independent management. I then ask whether, at the independent 
management equilibrium, spouses would voluntarily make income transfers. I find that, at 
an interior solution, transfers are neutral in that they have no effect on expenditure patterns 
or welfare levels. At a comer solution, transfers are no longer neutral. One spouse may 
voluntarily transfer income to the other, if his income is sufficiently high relative to hers.
A spouse’s optimization problem is to choose the values of public goods (Pj) private 
goods (Qi) and leisure (Li) which maximize welfare. The spouse’s problem can be written 
as:
max Wi= rWJsikUl(P,QkW  
subject to the constraint
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PiPi+p2Qi+wiLi=wiT+Ri- 2.7
The constraint 2.7 is found by combining the time constraint (equation 2.1), and the budget 
constraints (equation 2.2), while constraining the transfer (t^ ) between spouses to zero. A 
spouse's expenditures and leisure time are equal to his or her full income.
22.1 The Interior Solution
The first order conditions to the spouse's maximization problem are (substituting for 
Qi using the budget constraint 
above):
■3JT TjQi
2.8
and
P i^Q i
2.9
At a Coumot-Nash equilibrium each spouse's expenditures on leisure, private goods, and 
public goods solve the two first order conditions above, given that each person takes the 
other's behaviour as given, that is, in expression 2.8, dP/dP—O. I will consider first the 
"neutrality" property of the Coumot-Nash equilibrium and, second, under what conditions the 
equilibrium will exist.
One property of the Coumot-Nash equilibrium is that income transfers between 
spouses are neutral. This can be seen by examining the first order conditions for welfare
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maximization, 2.8 and 2.9. Suppose that an outside agent attempted to make a transfer of n 
from spouse h to spouse w. Spouse h could simply lower his public goods expenditures by 
71 and spouse w could increase hers by 7C. Each spouse would then be consuming the same 
bundle as he or she was prior to the transfer. Since that bundle satisfied the first order 
conditions prior to the transfer, it will satisfy the first order conditions after the transfer. A 
similar result has been proven in the context of the private provision of public goods by Warr 
(1983) and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986).
The neutrality of income transfers implies that demands depend on total household 
income, as the neoclassical model of household behaviour suggests. The distribution of 
household income is not important because public goods expenditures effectively pool the 
spouse’s incomes.
Under fairly weak conditions, a Coumot-Nash equilibrium will exist5 I will give a 
proof here that shows the existence of an equilibrium either at an interior solution or at a 
comer solution when n, the transfer between spouses, is zero. First, note that, because spouse 
j ’s household public consumption expenditures, Pj, are given, spouse i’s problem of choosing 
her public goods purchases Pi? is equivalent to choosing total public goods consumption, P, 
and so the objective function can be rewritten as:
max W .U Q j.L j) 2.10
P.QiXi
Second, note that her budget constraint can be rewritten (by adding pjPj to both sides of 2.7) 
as
5 The proof of existence given here draws from the analysis of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 
(1986). However, the proof given here expands the Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian results to take 
account of utility interdependence arising from caring.
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P,P + P A  + WjLj = WjT + Rj + p,Pj. 2.11
Because we are considering a Coumot-Nash equilibrium, spouse j ’s behaviour is taken as 
given, so the terms Qj and Lj in the welfare function 2.10 can be treated as parameters, and 
hence the problem defined by 2.10 and 2.11 is formally the same as a standard consumer 
demand problem.
Providing that preferences are convex and monotonic, the problem can be solved to 
find the total household public expenditures:
P=P(p,Qj,Lj,Ii+p1Pj) 2.12
where p=(Pi,p2»Wi,Wj) is a vector of prices, and Ii=wiT+Ri is spouse i’s income. The private 
goods reaction functions are given by:
Qpinax {0,Qi(p,Qj,Lj»Ii+PiPj)} 2.13
The reaction function for is parallel to 2.13. Using 2.12 we can define a public goods 
reaction function for spouse i:
Pi=max{0,Pi(p,QjJLj,Ii,Pj)} 2.14
Now define S=S* Sj in as the set of all possible consumption purchases for the spouses, 
where S1 is the set of combinations of P^Q, and Lit satisfying the budget constraint 2.7. The 
set is clearly compact and convex. The spouse's reaction functions (see 2.13 and 2.14) define 
a continuous mapping from the set S onto itself. By Brouwer's fixed point theorem, there 
must exist a fixed point, which will be the Coumot-Nash equilibrium.
The properties of the Coumot-Nash equilibrium in an interior solution can be seen 
clearly using an example, to which I will now turn.
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An example: Stone-Geary Welfare Function
If the spouses each have a Stone-Geary welfare function, and the spouses are at an 
interior solution, welfare maximization yields the private goods demand function (L; is 
analogous to QJ:
Q rQ i+— (.Ii+Pipi> where <V  ^
P i '  i+ V v
2.15
The public goods reaction function is given by:
Pr P ' - P ^ I i+PlP ) where
Pi 1+V v
2.16
The parameters au and a^ represent the relative weight placed on public goods and private 
consumption, respectively, in spouse i’s welfare function. The term in the final set of 
parentheses, li+PiPj, is full supernumerary income, plus the partner’s contribution to the 
household public expenditures. Full supernumerary income, is defined as 
li=Ri+wiT-p1P,-p2Qi,-wiL1\  This is essentially full income, as defined by Becker, including 
both property income Ri and the value of the individual's time endowment, WjT, less the 
amount of income which needs to be spent meeting subsistence requirements. The other 
spouse’s public good purchases (piPj) act like an increase in income. However, in the public 
goods reaction function (2.16), they have the additional affect of decreasing spouse i’s 
subsistence expenditures on public goods.
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F igure  2 .1 :  Cournot-Nash eq u ilib r iu m
h
s lo p e  = - ( 1 - a . , )
Pw
WW = w i f e ’ s r e a c t io n  fu n c t io n  
HH = husband’ s r e a c t io n  fu n c t io n
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The interaction between the family members is shown graphically in Figure 2.1. The 
slope of the husband’s reaction function HH is -(l-alh) or -(a2h+a3h). This coefficient 
represents the weight the husband places on his own private consumption relative to the sum 
of his private and the household public expenditures in his welfare function. The greater his 
relative preference for private expenditures, the more the husband will decrease his household 
public expenditures when the wife increases hers. Stability of the equilibrium requires that 
the wife's reaction function is steeper than the husband's, or that alw,alh< l.
The intersection of the two reaction functions is a Coumot-Nash equilibrium. This 
point is given by the public goods expenditure function:
PjP ^  - (1-c^Ij 2.17
where
The term 1* represents full supernumerary income without deducting subsistence expenditures 
on public goods. Public goods expenditures depend positively on own supernumerary income 
and negatively upon the other spouse’s supernumerary income. The constant q  may be 
interpreted as the effective share of household income (sum of public, P, and private (Qj, Lj) 
good budget shares) consumed by spouse j. Spouse j's  effective share is greater when he puts 
relatively more weight on his private consumption (a^ decreases) cr when his partner puts 
more weight on household public consumption (au increases). The term q will be between
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zero and one as long as (k a ^ a ^ l, which is guaranteed if neither spouse puts a negative 
weight on their own private consumption or household consumption.
F ig u re  2 .2 :  N e u t r a l i t y  in  th e  C ournot-N ash  e q u i l ib r iu m
P
3
P 1
j
P
3
Pi  PiA t r a n s f e r  o f  income from i  to  j  c a u se s  i ’ s r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  ( I I )
to  s h i f t  inw ards  to  I ’ l ’ , w h ile  j ' s  s h i f t s  ou tw ards  from J J  to  J ’ J ’ . 
The amount o f p u b l ic  goods p u rchased  by i  d e c r e a s e s  from P . to  
w h ile  th e  amount pu rchased  by j  i n c r e a s e s  from P. to  P . ’ , l e a v in g  
t o t a l  p u rc h a s e s  unchanged.  ^ ^
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When welfare maximization subject to the constraint of no intra-family income transfers 
produces an interior solution, relaxation of the constraint that there are no transfers between 
spouses (7tjj=0) has no real effect A transfer of income between spouses will be exactly 
offset by a change in public goods expenditure, and hence utility and welfare will be 
unchanged. A net transfer of 7ty from spouse i to spouse j reduces the former’s 
supernumerary income to 1 ^ ,  and raises the latter’s to I^ +TCy. The effect of a transfer on 
spouse i’s level of public goods expenditure under Nash conjectures is given by:
dpiPj/chty =-Cj-(l-q)=-l.
Similar reasoning shows that dpjP/drc^l. The transfer causes a one-for-one decrease in 
spouse i's  public goods expenditures and a corresponding increase in spouse j ’s public goods 
expenditures. The effect of the transfer is shown graphically in Figure 2.2. Spouse i’s 
reaction function, II, shifts inward to IT’ when her income is decreased. Spouse j ’s reaction 
function shifts outward from JJ to J’J ’, reflecting the increase in his income. The amount of 
public goods purchased by i, Piy falls, while j ’s purchases rise. The total level of purchases, 
however, is unchanged. Moreover, since the changes in each spouse’s public goods 
expenditures exactly offset the changes in income, the amount of income available for 
purchases of private goods and leisure is unchanged. Each spouse is able to attain the level 
of welfare which he or she enjoyed prior to the transfer.
2 2 2  The Corner Solution
The analysis so far has assumed that neither spouse is at a comer with respect to public 
goods expenditures. This need not be the case; one spouse’s income may be so low (and the
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marginal utility of income correspondingly high) that the first order conditions for welfare 
maximization are not satisfied at any positive level of public goods expenditures. For 
example, in Figure 2.1, the wife would make no public goods expenditures if her reaction 
function intersected the Ph axis below the husband’s reaction function. In what follows, I 
consider cases in which spouse j (the wealthier spouse, say the husband) purchases a positive 
amount of the public good P, while spouse i (say, the wife) is constrained, that is, P~0. 
Initially income transfers between spouses are constrained to zero, and then the effect of 
allowing income transfers is examined. I will begin with the general case, and then go on to 
consider a specific example.
Transfers between spouses constrained to zero.
The spouses will be at a comer solution when the poorer spouse (say the wife) 
maximizes her welfare by making no public goods purchases. This will be the case when 
(lfaXdW /dP^QW /dlJ
The contribution to welfare of the last dollar spent on public goods is less than the marginal 
contribution of income to welfare.
As a Nash equilibrium exists, it is possible to solve for the spouse’s demand functions, 
and substitute into each spouse’s utility function to find each spouse’s indirect utility function. 
The indirect utility functions will be of the form:
V W O ^ p )  2.18
Note that each spouse’s utility (as well as their welfare) depends on both spouse’s incomes. 
The wife’s utility clearly depends upon the husband’s income because she consumes the 
public goods he purchases. The husband’s utility may depend upon the wife’s income if her
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consumption is a complement to his. For example, his demand for leisure may depend on 
her leisure, in turn, is a function of her income.
From the indirect utility function 2.18 we can define a welfare function 
Wh=Vh+shwVw. The wealthier spouse, the husband, will choose to transfer income to his wife 
if doing so increases his welfare. Suppose the husband is contemplating a transfer, to 
his wife which increases her supernumerary income I* to Iw+7thw and decreases spouse h’s to 
Ifa_7Chw. The utility maximizing transfer will be one which satisfies the first order condition:
dvh dvw dvh dvw
The marginal contribution to the husband’s welfare of his own income is equal to the
marginal contribution of his wife’s income. A wealthier husband will transfer less income
to a poorer wife if she has a higher preference for public goods relative to private goods
(3V734 is large relative to 3V73IJ- If this is the case, it is more efficient for him to
transfer income indirectly by making higher public goods purchases. A more caring husband
(one with large s^) will put more weight on his wife’s preferences, which may be reflected
in either more public goods purchases or more income transfers, depending on the relative
size of 3V73IJ, and 3V73I*.
As discussed in Chapter 1, Becker (1981a) has argued that a transfer from a wealthier
spouse to a poorer spouse will induce the latter to maximize family income, a result which
he states in the form of the "Rotten Kid Theorem":
Each beneficiary, no matter how selfish, would maximize the family income 
of his benefactor, and thereby would internalize all effects of his actions on 
other beneficiaries. (Becker, 1981a, p. 7)
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A simple proof of the Rotten Kid Theorem can be given using the model developed here. 
If the husband makes a transfer to the wife, his budget constraint becomes:
TChw + PiPh + ViQh + whLh = whT + Rfa. 2.19
while hers becomes:
P2Qw + + wwT + R*. 220
Substitution of budget constraint 2.19 into 2.20 yields the new budget constraint for the wife: 
P2Qw + wJL* = whT + Rb + wwT + Rw - (pjPh + PiQt + whL J 
The income available for her own consumption is the total family income less her husband’s 
consumption. If she wishes to maximize her own consumption, taking her husband’s 
consumption as given, she will attempt to maximize family income, as the Rotten Kid 
Theorem predicts.
An example: The Stone-Geary Welfare Function
As for the interior solution, an example will serve to clarify the results given. 
Suppose each spouse has a Stone-Geary welfare function. Then, as in the interior solution, 
the wealthier spouse's (say spouse h’s) demands are given by equations 2.15 and 2.16. 
Substituting the demand functions into spouse h’s direct utility function (noting Pw=0) yields 
the indirect utility function:
V h^logt + Bihlog(a1i/p1) + B2hlog(a2h/p2) + 2.21
Note that the husband’s utility depends on his own income, and not his wife’s, because the 
Stone-Geary welfare function is separable in each spouse's leisure and private consumption 
expenditures.
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The constrained spouse’s (the wife’s) private good demand function is given by (from 
the first order conditions on private goods and leisure):
The demand for leisure is exactly analogous. Substituting these demand equations, and the 
husband’s public goods demand, into the wife’s direct utility function yields the indirect utility 
function:
The wife’s utility depends upon the husband’s supernumerary income, as well as her own, 
because she benefits indirectly from his income through his public goods expenditures* The 
coefficient on the own supernumerary income term is given by B^+Bj,,; the utility parameters 
corresponding to the goods the wife "purchases"; leisure and private goods.
Introducing transfers between spouses.
Now suppose that we allow transfers of income between spouses. The husband will 
choose the net transfer6 which maximizes his welfare. A net transfer of iq,w from the
where a^v
Vwc=Blwlog(alh/pl) + B2wlog(aVp2) + BawlogteVwJ 
+ Bjwloglh + (B^+BaJlogl** 222
6 It can be shown that when the wealthier spouse makes a voluntary transfer, 7^, to the other, 
the poorer spouse will not wish to make a positive transfer unless sij>(l/sjji). This condition will not 
be satisfied in the usual case where sji,Sji<=l.
wealthier spouse to the poor increases spouse w’s supernumerary income from I* to Iw+7ihw 
and decreases spouse h’s to 4-7^*. Substituting 2.21 and 222  into h’s welfare function 
Wh=Vh+shwVw, maximizing Wh with respect to 7thw, and solving yields:
*"■-------------~ s --------------
2.23
When the wife has no supernumerary income, the husband, transfers a portion s ^ l -  
Blw)/(l+shw) of his income to her, where the portion depends positively on his sympathy, shw. 
If the poorer spouse’s income increases, the transfer is reduced by a portion (l+s^jJ/C l+s,,,,) 
of the income increase, with the portion being less when the sympathy term is higher. The 
transfer is lower when the wife’s preference for public goods, B ^  is higher. When Blw is 
high, the husband is better off transferring income to his wife indirectly by purchasing public 
goods, rather than directly through a money transfer.
Rewriting equation 2.23, it may be seen that the transfer is positive if and only if:
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The interpretation of equation 2.24 is straightforward. The left hand side of the equation is 
the contribution to the wealthier spouse’s welfare of a marginal increase in the poorer 
spouse’s income. The right hand side is the contribution to the wealthier spouse’s welfare 
of a marginal increase in own income. If the wealthier spouse’s marginal valuation of his 
partner’s income is higher than his own, he will transfer income to his partner.
When condition 2.24 holds we have an allowance system, with a positive income transfer 
from the wealthier to the poor spouse. The Nash equilibrium level of public goods 
expenditures is found by substituting for 7^ in the wealthier spouse’s (j’s) demand function 
(2.16, 3Pj/3Pj=0, p£=0), which yields:
Plpr p ^ '* h p b iQ * in
U sn
The wealthier spouse’s private goods expenditures are given by
The poorer spouse makes no public goods expenditures. Her private goods expenditures are 
given by:
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+ M
The share of total supernumerary income taken up by purchases (net of subsistence 
requirements) for each good corresponds to the weight placed on that good in the wealthier 
spouse’s welfare function, when the welfare function is normalized so that 2i6ij+sjiI!j6ji= l. All 
demand functions and, therefore, the indirect utility function which measures each spouse's 
level of well-being, depend on the couple's total supernumerary income, and not on the 
division of income between spouses.
Housekeeping Allowances.
The provision by the wealthier spouse of a housekeeping allowance above and beyond 
the voluntary transfer has no effect on the equilibrium. Consider, initially, a situation where 
the poorer spouse is receiving an exogenously imposed transfer and consuming a welfare 
maximizing level of Qj and Lj (1^=0, otherwise a transfer would have no real effect). She 
receives an allowance, A, with which she purchases private goods for him (Qj). A reduction 
in the allowance of some amount accompanied by an equal reduction in her expenditures on 
the other spouse's private good (Qj) leaves her level of welfare unchanged. If Q* and L* were 
optimal prior to any decrease in the allowance, they will be so after such a decrease. Hie 
argument still holds when the allowance is used to purchase public goods Pj. The presence 
or absence of a housekeeping allowance will not alter the level of public goods purchases the 
wealthier spouse desires to make, and so the final level of purchases will be unaffected by 
changes in the housekeeping allowance. If the wealthier spouse’s purchases Pj do not change,
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the poorer spouse can maximize her utility by decreasing her purchases of (Pj) to offset a 
change in the allowance level and consuming the same level of Qi and 1^  as before.
Budgeting systems and relative incomes
Condition 2.24 is not satisfied for all comer solutions. The spouses will be at a comer 
solution without transfers if:
Such a region will exist if k ^ * . It can be shown that kb>cw if and only if S j^s^d , that is, 
at least one of the spouses cares more for himself than for his partner. If s ^ ^ l ,  so that 
each person cares as much for the other as for himself, then 1^=0 *, and transfers begin as 
soon as one spouse reaches a comer solution, and the relative incomes of the spouses do not 
affect either spouse’s consumption. The possibility that shwswh> l was ruled out above in 
equation 2.5. The analysis here shows the necessity for this assumption. If each spouse cared 
more about the other than about him or herself, each would desire to make positive transfers 
even when incomes are relatively equal, and transfers are neutraL
Using equation 2.25, we can describe how household budgeting systems vary with the 
spouses’ relative incomes. When relative incomes are in the range described in equation 2.25, 
we have an independent management system. The wife makes no public goods purchases and 
receives no income transfer from her husband. The wife’s income is spent on private goods 
and leisure; the husband’s On public goods, as well as his private goods and leisure. If the 
first inequality is reversed, that is, y^V lq , /(1-kJ, the husband will transfer income to the
where kh'
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wife. The household has an allowance budgeting system. 'When the second inequality is 
reversed, we are at an interior solution, where both spouses contribute to public goods. 
Income transfers have no effects, and couples are indifferent between allowance, shared and 
independent management budgeting systems.
F igu re  2 . 3 :  R e la t iv e  incomes and s o lu t io n s  to  th e  model
I* 1 - C -
hw
in t e r i o r  s o lu t io n
I* 1-C
1-K
wh
vh >
* h u sb a n d 1 s  f u l l  supernum erary incom e 
I*  -  w i f e ' s  f u l l  income l e s s  l e i s u r e  and p r iv a te  goods s u b s is te n c e  
r eq u ir em en ts  
■ in com e t r a n s f e r  from i  to  j .
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Figure 2.3 summarizes the results of the theoretical analysis. When incomes are 
relatively equal, spouses will be in the interior solution. When the poorer spouse has some 
income, but not enough to make public goods purchases, the wealthier spouse’s welfare 
maximization initially dictates no transfers (7^=0). Then, if the poorer spouse has sufficiently 
low relative income, one spouse will begin to make transfers to the other (ft^>0).
The size of the interior solution, positive transfers, and no transfers regions depends 
upon the spouses' preferences. As the caring of the husband for the wife increases, the 
positive transfers region ^ ,> 0  becomes larger. At the same time, if the wife's sympathy 
parameter s^  increases, the boundary between the interior and no transfers regions, 
I)/Iw*=cw/( 1 *cw), rotates upwards. So as shw and s^  approach one, the no-transfers region 
disappears. Holding the amount of caring constant, an increase in the dependent spouse's 
preferences for public goods (Blw, say), will decrease the size of the positive transfers region. 
The wealthier spouse will be able to increase in dependant's well-being by purchasing public 
goods (which benefit both spouses) rather than by making transfers.
Empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model. In fact, 
Pahl (1984) has found that the independent management system is most common in 
dual-eamer couples, who would be expected to be indifferent between shared and other forms 
of management, as shown in Table 2.1. Allowance or whole wage systems, which involve 
a transfer from one spouse to the other, appear in single-eamer couples, where one partner 
is more likely to have a low enough income that transfers of income occur voluntarily, as the 
theory predicts.
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There are also regional differences in the choice of budgeting system, which may be due
to either economic or cultural factors. Studies of couples in the South of England (Pahl, 
1984; McRae, 1987), have found shared management to be the most common budgeting 
system, as shown in Table 2.2. However elsewhere in Britain, and in Australia, the majority 
of couples adopt either whole wage or allowance systems (Gray, 1979; Edwards, 1981; 
Monis, 1984), as shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 reveals a large study-to-study variation in the number of couples adopting 
independent and shared management The variation may be partly attributable to differences 
among researchers as to what constitutes shared or independent management. It may also be 
explained by differences in sample composition; for example, Morris’s survey sample 
consisted of steel workers who had recently been made redundant. Finally, changes over time 
in banking technology and female labour force participation rates may have decreased the 
proportion of couples adopting the whole wage or allowance systems.
Table 2.1: The relation between employment status and budgeting
system.
Both or Husband Neither
wife only employed
employed employed
Whole wage 
Allowance 
Shared or
Independent management 75
10
16
10
30
60
56
18
36
Source: Pahl (1984)
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Table 2.2: Budgeting systems in the South of England,
Pahl McRae
Kent S. England
1982-83 1982-1983
Whole wage 14 _
Allowance 22 10
Shared management 56 50
Independent management 9 40
n=102 n=30
Source: Pahl (1984), McRae (1987).
Table 2.3: Budgeting systems in Britain and Australia.
Morris Edwards Gray
Wales Australia Edinburgh
1982 1981 1979
Whole wage 54 50 63
Allowance 18 14 46
Shared management 20 14 2
Independent management - 22
n=40 n=50 n=97
Sources: Gray (1979, Edwards (1981), Morris (1984).
Factors other than relative incomes no doubt influence a couple’s choice of budgeting 
system. One possibility is that monitoring considerations play a role. For example, whole 
wage systems are common when incomes are low, and an attempt by the wife to use a large 
share of family funds for personal consumption is soon evidenced by unpaid bills.
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2.3. Individual Optimization: Rational conjectures solution
In Section 2.2’s Coumot-Nash equilibrium each agent takes the other's behaviour as 
given. He expects that the other agent will not respond to a change in his behaviour. The 
Coumot-Nash equilibrium concept is criticized by oligopoly theorists on the grounds that 
agents’ conjectures are falsified by actual experience. If one agent actually, say, increases her 
public goods purchases, the other will respond by lowering his, contrary to the first agent's 
conjectures. Rational or consistent conjectures, developed in Laitner (1980), Ulph (1980) and 
Bresnahan (1981), require that spouses' conjectures be correct
23.1. Definition o f rational conjectures
Rational conjectures require that agents' beliefs about dxj/dxj should be at least locally 
correct Consider the "reaction function" x—f^ Xj) defined by the first order conditions to 
spouse i's maximization problem. An agent's conjecture q will be locally correct at a point 
Xj*, Xj* where
^ = 9 ^ * ) ^ ,  2.26
and similarly for rj.7 Intuitively, one agent’s rational conjecture is given by the slope of the 
other agent's reaction function at the equilibrium point
The definition of rational conjectures given by equation 2.26 above does not require that 
agents' conjectures on the second derivative of the reaction function be correct; that is, it is 
not the case that rj’sf'fo ). Ulph (1983) shows, in a general duopoly model, that, if the
7 The conjectures are locally correct in that the difference between agent j's  actual response to 
a change in x* and the conjectured response ri can be made arbitrarily small (less than some £>0) by 
taking a sufficiently small change in x  ^ The actual response is not necessarily equal to the 
conjectured response, even for very small changes in Xj, contrary to what is suggested by Bresnahan 
(1981), for example.
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derivatives of the conjecture q are allowed to vary freely, any output combination8 can be 
a rational conjectures equilibrium with appropriate conjectures. Ulph argues for restricting 
the agents to constant conjectures (r—k, some constant) at interior equilibria. A justification 
of linear conjectures is that agents' may have limited experience of behaviour away from the 
equilibrium point. As will be discussed in Section 2.3.2, the linearity of conjectures is crucial 
in determining whether income transfers between spouses have real effects.
The concept of rational conjectures needs to be more carefully defined at a point (xj*^*) 
where either fj or fj- is not differentiable. Nondifferentiability may occur when one spouse 
reaches a comer with respect to expenditures on Xi, so that a decrease in Xj leads to an 
increase in expenditures on but an increase in Xj causes no change in Xj. In Section 2 3 3  
1 argue that the conjectured response to an increase in public goods expenditures (say) will 
then differ from the conjectured response to a decrease in public goods expenditures. As a 
result, the spouses' reaction functions may be discontinuous, and the rational conjectures 
equilibrium may be indeterminate.
2 3 2 . Rational conjectures: Interior solution
As with the Coumot-Nash equilibrium, I begin by solving the welfare maximization 
problem assuming no intra-family transfers, and then explore the effect of relaxing this 
constraint. Welfare maximization produces the Stone-Geary reaction function:
8 That both firms believe could be chosen, and which does not violate second order conditions.
The imposition of rational conjectures as defined by equation 2.26 requires that (taking the 
derivative of the public goods reaction function 2.27 with respect to Pj and noting dP/dPfzrfr
r . J P‘~  1_a«
1 tP j U auri
2.28
A similar conditions applies for Solving these two conditions yields the result:9
ij=-( l-au )/^  2.29
Each spouse’s conjecture, rj} is a constant, which depends upon the parameters of both 
spouses' welfare functions, but not upon either spouse’s income or public goods expenditures.
Stability of the rational conjectures equilibrium requires first that -lor^cO . If this 
was not the case, a spouse would conjecture that a decrease in her public goods expenditures 
would lead to a greater increase in her husband’s expenditures, and so would immediately 
reduce her expenditures to the minimum possible. Second, j ’s reaction function (JJ) must be 
flatter than i’s (II), that is, the slope of JJ (rj is less negative than the slope of II (1/rj), as 
shown in Figure 2.4. Both of these conditions reduce to ^ < 1  or a ^ a ^ l .  Note that t-r^cl
9 Another solution to the set of equations implied by 2.28 has r-=Tj=-l and P=P\ The 
equilibrium is not stable, as the breakdown of P’ into and Pj is indeterminate.
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is equivalent to r*>(l/rj) since ij<0. The rational conjecture (2.29) will not be stable if each 
spouse puts too little weight on public goods relative to his or her own private consumption 
in the welfare function. The condition a ^ a ^ l  represents a strong restriction on the values 
which may be taken by the parameters BH and s^ .
F igu re 2 . 4 :  R a tio n a l c o n je c tu r e s  eq u ilib r iu m
s lo p e  “ JL
s lo p e  * r . *  - ( 1 - a  . )
l i
I I  * sp o u se  i Ts  r e a c t io n  f u n c t io n .  
JJ * sp o u se  j  *s  r e a c t io n  f u n c t io n .
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Substituting for the conjecture into spouse i’s public goods demand function, equation 
2.27, yields:
PiPi^iCP’-PjHK^i+au-iyaJPi+p^j] 2.30
The requirement of rational conjectures is satisfied, since the derivative OP/OPj from equation 
2.30 is equal to the expression for j ’s conjecture, rj5 from equation 2.29. The coefficient on 
income in (2.30), (a^+ajj-iya^, is smaller than the Coumot-Nash income coefficient, au, 
unless ajj=l, in which case the two are equal For a given level of income, less of the public 
good is demanded, because spouse i realizes that an increase in her expenditures will provoke 
a decrease in the other’s (unless aj—l, in which case of all j ’s income is spent on public 
goods). Using equation 2.30 and the corresponding expression for Pj to solve for the level 
of public goods expenditure yields:
PiPr^iJi -(l-a^Ij 2.31
Public goods expenditures depend positively on own supernumerary income and negatively 
on the other spouse’s supernumerary income.
Relaxing the constraint that transfers are nil has no effect on the level of public goods 
expenditures or welfare. The effect of a transfer 7  ^from spouse j to spouse i is given by 
(from equation 2.31):
9p,Pi/a7tji=-(l-aii)-aH=-l.
As in the case of Nash conjectures, a transfer of income from husband to wife is completely 
offset by changes in expenditures on public goods.
Transfers are neutral for all rational conjectures for which ^  is a constant As in the Nash 
equilibrium, the first order condition for welfare maximization is given by 2.8 and 2.9. A
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transfer of income, accompanied by offsetting changes in public goods expenditures, has no 
effect on either spouse’s welfare or their conjectures (because conjectures are constant), 
therefore the first order conditions for optimization will still be satisfied.
As argued in Section 2.3.1, there are good reasons for restricting the conjectures iit to 
constants. However, if we allow for more general conjectures, neutrality does not necessarily 
hold. Taking a more general definition of rational conjectures (Ulph, 1983, or Ulph, 1987), 
suppose that agent i has conjectures about agent j ’s choice Xj of the form 
xj=Oi(xi,xi*,xj*)
where x*\ x* is the equilibrium level of public good expenditures, and ri=d<E>/3xi. Neutrality 
requires that the derivatives of O* with respect to xi depend only on other expenditures, and 
x*, where x*=x*+x* is the total equilibrium expenditures. If this is the case then a 
redistribution of income and public goods expenditures leaves the value of the first order 
conditions unchanged. There is, however, no reason why this restriction necessarily holds.
2 3 3  Corner solutions
Except at one point, the rational conjectures comer solution coincides with the Nash 
equilibrium described in Section 2.2. I will begin by showing that the Nash comer solution 
can be supported by rational conjectures, and then go on to consider three solutions: one, the 
comer solution with no transfers; two, the comer solution with transfers; and three, the 
boundary between the comer and interior solutions.
Nash solution supported by rational conjectures.
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Suppose that the poorer spouse, say the wife, is at a comer solution with respect to her 
public goods purchases. Her desired level of public goods expenditures is less than zero, 
formally (from equation 2.31):
aiwV-(l-ai„)Ih<0
In this case, the rational conjectures equilibrium is the Coumot-Nash equilibrium.
The husband’s conjecture, rh, is equal to zero. A small change in his public goods 
expenditure will not shift the wife’s expenditures away from zero. Substituting rh=0 into 
equation 2.27 yields the reaction function
PA i^P^PiPw+ i^hfli+PiPw) 232
Equation 2.32 describes both the Coumot-Nash and the rational conjectures (no transfers) 
comer solution. Differentiating equation 2.32 gives the wife’s rational conjecture 
rw=9Ph/9Pw=-(l-alh). The conjecture is larger (less negative) than the interior rational 
conjecture given by equation 2.29, reflecting the steeper slope of the husband’s Coumot-Nash 
reaction function. The wife’s conjecture ^=-(1-8^ justifies the husband’s belief that Pw=0. 
Substituting for rw and Ph (from 2.32) into equation 2.27 yields equation 2.31 - by assumption, 
the value of p ^  predicted by this equation is less than or equal to zero. The equilibrium 
conjectures are given by rh=0, rw=-(l-alh), and the equilibrium levels of expenditure are the 
same as with Nash conjectures.
The corner solutions
Rational conjectures (pre-transfer) demands are identical to Nash demands at a comer 
solution, and so the welfare maximizing transfer is given by equation 2.23. The transfer will 
be positive under the same conditions as held for the Coumot-Nash equilibrium, equation
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2.24. Condition 2.24 is not satisfied for all comer solutions. Rewriting equation 231, the 
wife will be at a comer solution with respect to public goods expenditures when:
i - p ,:
2.33
When condition 2.33 holds with strict inequality but 2.24 does not, there will be no transfers 
between spouses. For there to be a region where this is true, we must have swhsbw<(l/&lh). 
Note that the restrictions on caring are less strict that in the Coumot-Nash equilibrium case. 
The financial management system will be one of independent management The equilibrium 
will correspond to the rational conjectures no-transfers comer solution described above. Hie 
wife makes no public goods purchases. Her income is spent on private goods and leisure; die 
husband's income goes towards buying public goods, as well as his private goods and leisure.
When condition 2.24 holds with stria inequality, the husband’s rational conjecture is that 
d?Jd?h=0. His demand for public goods is given by
PiPh=Pi(P’-pw)+aih(Jh+P.-Jth.)- 
The wife's rational conjecture, accordingly, is:
ap1/apw=-i+(a11/p1xi-a7thvapw)=-i. 2.34
The result 2.34 holds because the husband will decrease his public goods expenditures one 
for one if the wife increases hers, using his additional disposable income to increase his 
transfer to her. With a conjecture of rw=-l, the wife will not make positive purchases of
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public goods (substituting for rw and Ph in 2.27), even if the husband makes a marginal 
increase in his public goods purchases. Hence the husband’s conjecture 9Pw/3Ph is supported 
by the wife’s behaviour.
The boundary between interior and comer solutions
The wife will be at the boundary between the interior and comer solutions when (from 
equation 2.30)
PiPws=Pi(P*”I>h)+[(aiw+aih"l)/ai J  Ptt+PiP 2. 35 
When equation 2.34 holds, the rational conjectures equilibrium must be carefully defined. 
The husband, when increasing his public goods expenditures, may rationally conjecture rh=0. 
The wife’s desired level of public goods expenditures (from 2.30) falls to less than zero. 
However, she is constrained to keeping expenditures at zero, hence her level of spending does 
not change. If, however, the husband decreases his public goods purchases by some oO , the 
wife desires to increase her public goods purchases. The husband’s rational conjecture on his 
wife’s response to an increase in his public goods expenditure is some rh<0.
If the husband has two conjectures - one for increases in his expenditures and one for 
decreases - which conjecture do we substitute into 221 to find his reaction function? Ulph 
(1983) argues, in the context of a duopoly model, that the appropriate conjecture is the non­
zero conjecture (p. 147). An explanation of why this is so might be that, if a firm i has 
conjectures r—0, then it will decrease its output (the Coumot-Nash output level being lower
than the rational conjectures output level). The decrease in its output will induce an increase 
in its rival’s output, falsifying the conjecture r-=0.10
F igure 2 . 5 :  The boundary between in te r io r  and corner s o lu t io n s
P*
wP*
N = en d p o in t o f  husband’ s  C ournot-N ash r e a c t io n  fu n c tio n
HP, * husband’ s  r a t io n a l  c o n je c tu r e s  r e a c t io n  fu n c t io n  h
WP, 88 w i f e ’s  r a t io n a l  c o n je c tu r e s  r e a c t io n  fu n c tio n  h
10 MIf firm 2 were to-try to exploit firm l ’s lack of response by increasing its profit, it would 
actually reduce its profits by moving away from the profit-maximizing output" (Ulph, 1983, p. 146).
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In the case of marriage, however, if the husband conjectures rh=0 he will increase his 
public goods expenditure. This is shown in Figure 2.5. The husband’s rational conjectures 
reaction function (as given by 2.30) is denoted by HPh and the wife’s by WPh. The endpoint 
of the husband’s Coumot-Nash reaction function (2.16) is represented by point N. If the 
husband conjectures rh=0 he is adopting Coumot-Nash conjectures. His level of public goods 
purchases increases from Ph to the Coumot-Nash level, point N. The wife cannot decrease 
her expenditure in response to this increase, and so the conjecture rh=0 is confirmed by 
experience. At the same time, however, if the husband tries to confirm the conjecture rh<0 
by experimentally decreasing his expenditures, the wife will increase her expenditures, hence 
rh<0 can also be confirmed. As an experiment in the form of changes in expenditures can 
confirm either conjecture, the husband’s behaviour at the boundary between interior and 
comer solutions is indeterminate.
23.4. Comparison o f Nash and Rational Conjectures Equilibria
The rational conjectural equilibrium is compared with the Nash equilibrium in Figure 2.6. 
The wife’s rational conjectures reaction function is given by RJE^ and her Nash reaction 
function by while the corresponding reaction functions for the husband are and 
NhNh. The husband’s rational conjectures reaction function is steeper than his Nash reaction 
function. A unit increase in the wife's public goods expenditure causes a greater decrease in 
the husband’s public goods expenditure under rational conjectures, since the husband 
anticipates that the wife will increase her expenditure when he decreases his. The husband's 
rational conjectures reaction function also has a lower Ph intercept than his Nash reaction
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F igure 2 . 6 :  Comparison o f Nash and R a tio n a l C onjectures
E q u ilib r ia
T o ta l e x p e n d itu r e s  a r e  h ig h e r  a r  th e  Nash e q u ilib r iu m  (N) than  
a t  th e  n a t io n a l  c o n je c tu r e s  e q u ilib r iu m  (R) .
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function. That is, when the wife’s public goods expenditures are nil, the husband’s public 
goods expenditures will be lower if he has rational conjectures. Each spouse's public goods 
expenditure is lower at a rational conjectures equilibrium (providing a ^ a ^ l) , with the 
difference in expenditure levels being given by:
P.PiN-P.PiR=(ci-a11)(li+Ij*)
The difference is always positive since
ci-ali=[ali(l-au)(l-alj)]/[ali+airalia1J]>0 
The gap the equilibria depends on the couple’s total supernumerary income, that is, income 
net of consumption requirements, and the parameters of the spouses' welfare functions. The 
closer ajj and au are to one, that is, the greater the relative weight put on public expenditures, 
the smaller the difference will be. It is worth noting that our results differ from Comes and 
Sandlers (1984) analysis of voluntary public goods provision. Comes and Sandler find that 
allowing for a range of conjectural variations leads to a solution closer to the Pareto optimum. 
This is because, with their conjectures, a person expects his provision to be matched by 
others. People follow a Kantian "do unto others as you would have them do unto you" 
behavioural rule. The rational conjectures we find are of the "ffee-ride on others before they 
ffee-ride on you" variety, that is, a person expects an increase in his public goods provision 
to lower, not raise, other individual's provision levels.
2.4. Shared management
In Sections 2.2 and 2.3, spouses adopted individual control systems of financial 
management. The spouses’ optimization problems were linked through consumption 
externalities. Under a shared management system, interdependence arises through income
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effects, as one spouse's work decision alters the common budget constraint In the first part 
of this section, I discuss Leuthold (1968), which develops the basic shared management 
model In the second, I expand Leuthold's model to include caring. In the third, I introduce 
private goods, and show that, in this case, shared management produces the individual control 
interior solution.
As discussed in Chapter 1, Leuthold (1968) develops a model in which each spouse 
maximizes a utility function of the form,
UrflJogOT.Y^BJogO^V), Sj%=l. 
subject to the constraint
236
where R* is property income, Lj leisure and Y income spent on other goods. Each spouse’s 
problem in Leuthold's model is technically the same as that under an individual control 
management system when Sji=Sy=0, all goods are public (so P=Y), and the spouses’ budget 
constraints (equations 2.1 and 2.2) are substituted into the identity P^+Pj=P. Although the 
mathematical structure of the two models is similar, the interpretation of the equations is 
different. Leuthold’s model represents a shared management system. Each spouse faces the 
same budget constraint, and so interdependence in the spouses’ optimization problems arises 
through income effects as each spouse adjusts his or her work decisions.
Caring may be introduced into Leuthold’s model by changing the spouse’s objective 
function to a welfare function, as discussed in Section 2.1.3. Suppose each spouse maximizes 
a welfare function
Wi=£Kjsij[B,jlog(Y-Yj’)+B2ilog(Lj-Lj’)]. s -1 , s ^ l  237
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subject to the constraint 2.35. To make it easier to solve for I assume that Y ^Y j’. With 
Nash conjectures, 3W/3W—0. Solving as in Section 2.2 produces the equilibrium level of 
earnings:
WiWrdiWiCT-VHl-diXwjCr-V^Y'+R) 2.38
where
Pl{PV+*>Pli)+(1+*;#liXPu+W  aifhi+aU
Equation 2.37 differs from the interior individual control Nash equilibrium in public goods 
(equation 2.17) in two respects: first, q  in equation 2.17 replaces the parameter a^ with 
a^+aj—l-a^  that is, it includes the private goods parameter; second, own property income R* 
is pooled with the other spouse's supernumerary income, reflecting the pooling which actually 
occurs with shared management
The rational conjectures equilibrium is found by imposing the equilibrium condition 
r-sdWj/dWi and solving for rt. Some calculation shows that the rational conjecture is given 
by:
«r=-[(l-aijy*iJ(w/W|).
where ax [(BxjH-SjjBjj)/( 1 -t-SijBjj)], the weight placed on public goods in spouse i’s welfare 
function. It should be noted that, in order to simplify calculation of the rational conjecture, 
I have not substituted for Lj in spouse i’s welfare function. The rational conjecture under 
shared management is differs from that calculated under independent management in that the
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shared management conjecture depends upon the relative wage rate. Substituting for r£ into 
the reaction functions and solving yields the following expression for earnings:
WiW^wjfr-WMi-auXwjCr-VHR-Y-) 2.39
Equation 2.38, like equation 2.37, differs from the corresponding individual control rational 
conjectures interior solution, equation 2.31, in that all property income is pooled together with 
the other spouse’s supernumerary income.
When private goods are introduced, shared management produces the individual control 
interior solution. The spouses’ budget constraint becomes:
Zi(Ri+wiWr p2Qi)=P
Note that the price of public goods is normalized to equal one. Substituting for P and L* in 
spouse i’s welfare function (equation 2.36), taking the first order conditions with respect to 
Wi and Qi, and solving, with the assumption of Nash conjectures, yields the demand 
functions:
wiWi=-a3i[Ii+Rj+WjWJ-p2Qj] + WiCT-L,’) 2.40
and
PiQi^Bi+VWjWfPzQj] "** P2Q  2.41
where a^ is the weight placed on leisure in i’s welfare function, and is the weight placed 
on private consumption, as in the independent management Nash equilibrium. Substituting 
for W| and Qi in spouse j's  demand functions (using 2.39 and 2.40) produces two equations 
in Qj and Wj. These can be solved to give:
wjWj=-a3jc i(Ii+Ij+P’) + Wj(T-Lj’) 2.42
and
p2Qpa2jci(Ii+lj+P’) + fcQi’ Z43
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where q is the coefficient on supernumerary income in the independent control Nash 
equilibrium (see equation 2.17). As the model is symmetric, the solutions for Q  and W* are 
analogous. Equations 2.41 and 2.42 are, in fact, identical to the demand for private goods and 
labour supply in the individual control interior solution.11 The intuitive reasoning behind 
the result is straightforward. Public goods expenditures in the individual control interior 
solution effectively act as an income pooling device, producing the same result as shared 
management.
The difference between shared management and individual control occurs when one 
spouse’s desired public goods expenditures are zero or even negative. With individual 
control, the poorer spouse cannot make a negative level of public goods expenditures. With 
shared management, however, the poorer spouse is not so constrained. By taking out more 
from the income pool than she contributes, she makes a negative contribution to the public 
pool, effectively making negative public goods expenditures.
Conclusions
This chapter has developed a model of family decision making. Each variant of the 
model illustrates an interesting point
The first variant of the model illustrates how, with individual control of resources, the 
division of income between spouses influences the type of equilibrium obtained and, in certain 
cases, expenditures patterns. At an "interior solution", when spouses’ incomes are 
comparatively equal, expenditures patterns are determined by the interaction of both spouses’
11 To check that this is the case, substitute 2.41 and 2.42 into the budget constraint. The 
resulting expression for public goods expenditures is the sum of individual public goods demands in 
the individual control model (equation 2.17, i=ij).
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preferences, and the equilibrium is unaffected by small redistributions of income. When one 
spouse is too poor to contribute to public goods expenditures, but not poor enough to receive 
income transfers from the other spouse, income redistribution is no longer neutral Changes 
in relative incomes change expenditure patterns. However, when one spouse is poor enough 
that she receives an income transfer from the other spouse, expenditures reflect the 
preferences of the wealthier spouse.
The assumption of rational conjectures changes the results in two significant ways. 
First, it is no longer possible to give a general proof that, in the interior solution, small 
income transfers have no effect However, with a Stone-Geaiy welfare function, neutrality 
is found to hold. A second difference is the non-existence of rational conjectures when one 
spouse reaches a comer solution and a concomitant discontinuity in the other spouse’s demand 
functions.
With shared management spouses are, in effect always at an interior solution. The 
pooling of income and the purchasing of public goods are equivalent in their effects on 
spouses’ decision-making.
Having developed an individualistic model of the family, we are now in a position to 
discover whether or not it yields new insights. Our test case is the analysis of family taxation 
policy. In chapter 4 we use the model to explore the properties of the optimum tax rates for 
husband and wife. As a preliminary to the optimal taxation analysis, however, we need to 
discuss the appropriate role of government in private, family affairs. Chapter 3 considers 
goals for government policy towards the family.
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Chapter 3
Goals for tax policy towards the family
Why a taxation policy towards the family? Because decisions on labour supply, household 
production and fertility made within the family have consequences for a nation's economic 
performance. Taxation may have an effect on the decisions that families make. Examples 
of such policies are the U.K. income tax system, which provides an additional tax allowance 
for married couples, and the permitting of income splitting between husband and wife under 
the U.S. tax code, which ensures that primary and secondary earners face the same marginal 
tax rate. Such programs create incentives to marry and alter the incentives for labour force 
participation, although the extent of these effects is a matter of some debate (see for example 
Bishop, 1980).
An attractive aim for government policy is "neutrality" in the treatment of the family. 
The government should not intervene in family life. However, it can be argued that neutrality 
as a goal is infeasible, because alternative conceptions of neutrality conflict. History, equity, 
and the public interest are as important in directing tax policy as neutrality. In section 3.1 
we explore some family taxation policy debates.
If we cannot be completely neutral in our treatment of the family, how can we trade
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off neutrality and other goals? The welfaiist perspective of economic analysis provides one
framework for making such trade-offs. Values such as neutrality, equity and efficiency are
traded off by policy makers on the basis of individuals’ preferences. Section 3 2  compares
welfarism with a number of other approaches to trading off various policy goals.
One subject which has been problematic for welfaiist analysis is interdependence
between people’s well-being. Suppose a person enjoys seeing others suffer and would prefer
to live in a community where suffering was widespread. Should society as a whole respect
the individual’s preferences and not try to prevent suffering? Or should such meddlesome
preferences be ignored? While we cannot hope to resolve the issues raised by
interdependence in well-being which have troubled many utilitarians, we do outline certain
of the main features of the debate, and suggest a way forward which allows us to proceed to
optimal tax analysis.
3.1 Neutrality and the policy debate
It is a feature of much recent liberal thought that the fundamental institutions of
government and of the legal order are required to be neutral as to rival moral ideals and
conceptions of the good life (Gray, 1988, p. 136). Although Rawls (1971) does not use die
term "neutrality" his discussion of toleration and the common interest (section 34) contains
a good description of what is meant by the term:
...particular associations may be freely organized as their members wish, and 
they may have their own internal life and discipline subject to die restriction 
that their members have a real choice of whether to continue their affiliation.
(Rawls, 1971, p. 212).
For Rawls, neutrality is an application of moral liberty, freedom of thought and belief, and 
of religious practice (pp. 211-212). It is regulated, like other liberties, by the state’s interest 
in public order and security, as disruption of these conditions is a danger for die liberty of alL
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Political neutrality is closely related to economic notions of neutrality. If the organization of 
associations is determined entirely by their members’ decisions, and these decisions are not 
distorted by government policy, then economic neutrality holds.
Neutrality has two implications for taxation policy. First, the state should be neutral 
as to the organization of the family, and so families with equal resources and equal needs 
should be treated equally in all respects, including taxation. No particular family type (such 
as two-earner couples) should be subsidized at the expense of other family types. The tax 
unit is the family, that is, there should be joint taxation, either with or without income 
splitting. Second, public policy should be neutral with respect to marital status so that, in 
Rawls’ phrase, "members have a real choice of whether to continue their affiliation". Two 
single individuals should be taxed on the same basis as a married couple, as any other basis 
for taxation will create either an incentive or a disincentive to marry. The tax unit is the 
individual.
A progressive tax system cannot be neutral with respect to marital status and also 
neutral with respect to family structure. For example, consider a tax system designed so that 
people (married or single) earning £10,000 per year pay £2,000 in tax whereas those earning 
£20,000 per year pay £5,000 in tax. A married couple with two earners, each earning 
£10,000 per year, will pay £1,000 less tax than a single-earner married couple, in which the 
earner’s income is £20,000 per year. The tax system favours the two earner couple. If, on 
the other hand, the tax system was based on a married couple’s total earnings without income 
splitting, the two earner couple would have to pay £1,000 per year more tax when married 
than when cohabiting, creating a disincentive to many. If income splitting were allowed, the 
single earner couple would pay £1,000 less per year when married, creating an incentive to
84
marry. With or without income splitting, the tax system is not neutral with respect to 
status.
Considering actual tax systems, the reasons given for preferring either joint taxation 
(and neutrality with respect to family structure) or individual taxation (and neutrality with 
respect to marital status) fall into a number of categories. Historical marriage laws were one 
factor contributing to the establishment of joint taxation. It is justified today on the grounds 
that, because income is shared within the family, joint taxation is a more equitable form of 
taxation. A final consideration, which may favour either joint or individual taxation, is the 
public interest.
The United States currently and the United Kingdom until recent reforms1 have 
systems of joint taxation, with and without income splitting, respectively. In both countries, 
historical factors contributed to the presence of joint taxation. In the United States, joint 
taxation was allowed first in states that had "community property" systems inherited from 
Spain, which presumed that all property of a married couple was held in common. As many 
states began to adopt community property systems to lower residents’ tax burdens and stop 
wealthy residents from moving away, income splitting provisions were extended to all states 
(Groves, 1963). hi the United Kingdom, at the time of the Napoleonic Wars, when die first 
income tax laws were passed, a married woman had few property rights, and so her income
1 While changes in the tax treatment of investment income, for example, have moved the UJC 
system towards an individual taxation basis, traces of joint taxation remain. For example, Inland 
Revenue form 33 (1988) contains the instructions "If you are a married woman living with your 
husband, please complete the form with your husband’s details (or, if you prefer, ask him to complete 
it). This is because your husband’s Tax Office is responsible for your joint tax affairs." Also, the 
married couple’s allowance has remained in place, and goes automatically to the husband, unless his 
taxable income is less than the sum of his personal allowance plus the married couple’s allowance 
(The Observer, "MCA and MCPs", 1 April 1990).
85
was deemed to be that of her husband for the purposes of tax.
The oldest historical reason for treating a married woman’s property as that of her 
husband is that husband and wife are fused by love, custom, or nature into a single political 
and economic entity. Blackstone argued that, under coverture, man and woman become one 
when they marry, that one being the man. (Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, cited in Pateman, 1988, pp. 155-6). Political philosophers in the social contract 
tradition, including such influential thinkers as Locke, Hobbes and Hegel reached similar 
conclusions to Blackstone on the rights of married women (an excellent discussion of the 
views of these writers on the relationship between men and women can be found in Pateman, 
1988). For example, Hegel writes "The family is represented in public by the husband, the 
‘one person* created by the marriage contract [i.e., by marriage]" (Pateman, pp. 176-77). 
Hegel views the family as a private entity, separate from civil society, and represented in civil 
society by the man, because marriage "creates a substantive relation constituted by ‘love, trust, 
and common sharing of their entire existence as individuals*" (Philosophy of Right, quoted 
by Pateman, 1988, p. 174). Historically, it has been thought that the bonds between husband 
and wife prevent the wife from being an independent member of society. Although today 
women and men have equal rights to participate in society, at least part of the reasoning 
leading up to, say, Hegel’s conclusions still rinds favour. The presumption of equal sharing 
within the family provides an equity argument for joint taxation.
The equity argument for joint taxation is based on two considerations. First, tax 
liabilities should be based on ability to pay. Second, the appropriate measure of a family’s 
ability to pay is its total income, because income is shared between all family members. 
"Spouses in the normal case pool and share their income" (Groves, 1963, p. 70). "There is
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a powerful school of thought which holds that ability to pay as related to families depends 
on the combined income of all members of the family" (Mockler, Smith and Frenette, 1966). 
MacRae (1980, p. 104-5) advocates income splitting2 for married couples to account for the 
presence of direct cash transfers from high earning to low earning spouses, and the 
contribution of high earners to household expenses. Yet there are problems with this line of 
reasoning. There is little empirical evidence on the extent of sharing within fam ilies, or 
theoretical reasons to believe that sharing is the norm, as discussed in Chapter 1. Even if it 
is accepted that sharing is the norm, the fact remains that government policy is likely to 
matter most in those, perhaps unusual, families where sharing is less than complete. It is for 
those families that it matters, for example, which spouse receives the family allowance 
cheque.
A number of countries have recently switched from joint to individual taxation, such 
as Austria (1973), Denmark (1970), Finland (1976), Italy, (1976), the Netherlands (1973), and 
Sweden (1971) (OECD, 1986). The argument for individual taxation, and neutrality with 
respect to marital status, like the argument for joint taxation, revolves around equity 
considerations. Commentators in both the UJC. and the U.S. have attacked specific aspects 
of joint taxation on equity grounds. In the UJC., Freeman, Hammond, Masson and Morris 
(1988) use the criterion of "fairness" to decide the issue. They favour individual taxation on 
the grounds that it is not fair for unmarried taxpayers to subsidize married couples, as occured 
under the system of joint taxation (1988, p. 109) with the married man’s allowance. In the 
U.S. Munnell (1980) also argues for an individually based taxation system which is neutral
2 That is, "the appropriate tax for the couple is...twice die tax on their average income" 
(MacRae, 1980, p. 105).
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with respect to marital status. She questions the assumption that total household resources 
is the appropriate measure of ability to pay: "In the contemporary environment it may be 
more reasonable to assume that each spouse has a proprietary interest in his or her own 
income and would prefer to be taxed individually" (Munnell, 1980, p. 252). A more general 
equity argument against the U.S. system of joint taxation with income splitting is that it is 
unfair for a single earner family to pay the same taxes as a two earner family, since the single 
earner family benefits from the (untaxed) home production of the non-working spouse. From 
the number of equity arguments for both individual taxation and joint taxation, it is clear that 
equity considerations alone are not enough to choose between the two. A possible further 
consideration is the public interest.
Society may have overall goals such as the encouragement (discouragement) of population 
growth or care for the elderly or handicapped in the home. A government with such goals 
may favour (tax) marriage or give tax breaks to single earner (dual earner) couples. It can 
be argued that regulation is justified on the grounds that, say, population growth causes 
indirect harm to or provides indirect benefits for other members of society. For example, 
Carlson (1985) argues for an increase in the value of the exemption for dependent children 
provided in the U.S. tax code from $1,040 to $4,000 (p. 15) on the grounds that economic 
growth and care of the elderly requires a growing population (p.14).3 However, the case 
could be made that it is wrong to meddle with incentives for family formation, a point which 
will be taken up below.
It could be argued that the division between joint and individually based taxation is
3 In more spirited language, Carlson argues that "the continuation of the American experiment 
in free society requires a reweighting of incentives in favor of family life" (p. 14).
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a false dichotomy. Why not allow a married couple to opt to be treated either as two singles 
or as one tax unit? Doesn’t this achieve neutrality? One can observe, first, that it is not 
neutral unless unmarried couples have the same freedom to opt for either tax treatment. 
Otherwise there would be an advantage to marriage, namely the advantage of choice of tax 
treatment. And if, to achieve neutrality, the advantages of choice are extended to unmarried 
heterosexual couples, why should the same advantages not be given to homosexual couples, 
or any two cohabiting individuals? Yet if we accept that these groups have rights to be taxed 
as married couples, we run up against other obstacles. For example, it seems doubtful that 
a policy of extending the UJC married couple’s allowance to unmarried couples would be 
politically feasible. It would result in a large revenue loss, and there is no compelling equity 
or public interest reason to tax cohabiting couples less than single individuals.
In summary, neutrality with respect to the family is not a viable guide far public 
policy. Neutrality can be interpreted in at least two ways, that is, as neutrality with respect 
to family structure or as neutrality with respect to marital status. These two interpretations 
can and do conflict. When we try to understand the conflict by examining the consequences 
of neutrality in more general terms, we see that marriage has special features. Husband and 
wife have historically been treated as one because of their presumed natural and social bonds. 
Today we no longer believe that when man and woman marry, they become one, that one 
being the man. However, governments still give families special treatment The arguments 
for doing so frequently revolve around the public interest Hence die question arises: How 
much of a benefit to the public interest justifies intervention in private life?
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3.2 Trading off neutrality
There are a range of approaches to the trade-off between neutrality and other values. 
The libertarian view is that liberty is prior to any other value (see, for example, Nozick, 
1974). Pluralist views allow partial commensurability of liberty and social welfare (Griffin, 
1986). Finally, welfarism takes the view that the welfare of society is a function of the well­
being of individual members of society (Sen, 1982, p. 19). Any commodity is of value in so 
far as it contributes to individual utility.
The libertarian viewpoint, exemplified by Nozick (1974), gives a coherent view of 
treatment of the family. People are free to organise their domestic arrangements as they wish. 
With a minimal state, and hence a minimal tax burden, the distortions imposed by taxation 
on family life are minimal. What are the objections to the Nozickian libertarian view? 
Nozick’s arguments are based on the primacy of property rights. Yet there are other values, 
such as the value of human life. There may be times when the lives of the starving can only 
be saved by violating the property rights of the well-endowed. In this case, valuing human 
life above private property rights entails rejecting Nozick’s libertarian conception of justice 
(Lessnoff, 1978, p. 145). People at times will choose to give up a certain amount of liberty 
for other values, such as life. There are circumstances under which people can and do choose 
to sacrifice liberty.
The pluralist view recognises that values may conflict, and is adopted by Fishkin 
(1983) and Griffin (1986). Fishkin argues that three widely accepted liberal principles, that 
is, the principles of merit, equality of life chances, and the autonomy of the family, inevitably 
conflict. In response to the conflict, he offers a "limited liberalism" or "ideals without an 
ideal" (p. 193). There is a plurality of principles, to be traded off in particular cases (p. 192).
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The question of how principles are to be traded off is left open by Fishkin. Griffin (1986), 
however, addresses the question further. There are a number of values, of which liberty is 
one. When values conflict, we rank them in the sense that we "not just choose one rather 
than the other, but regard it as worth more. That is the ultim as scale here: worth to one’s 
life" (p. 90). Griffin comes closer than either Nozick or Fishkin to the welfarist view that two 
social states can be compared on the basis of a social welfare function which depends on 
individual well-being on each of the two states.
In Griffin’s account, as in work in welfare economics (Arrow, 1963), an individual’s 
well-being in each of several social states is measured by his ranking of these states. Yet 
Griffin’s account of well-being is not exactly the same as welfarist well-being. What gives 
the satisfaction of desires in a state of society value is being informed by "a perception of the 
nature of object of desire" (Griffin, 1986, p. 323). Desires not so informed, such as a desire 
to count blades of grass all day, do not count Liberty and prosperity (or efficiency or equity) 
each have value, to be assessed within the single framework of well-being (p. 309) by 
informed individuals. In contrast the welfarist view takes social welfare to be a function of 
(possibly uninformed) individuals’ well-being. Given two states of the world, A and B, 
identical except that in A, a person is able to count blades of grass all day if he chooses, 
while in B he is no t A is preferred to B, because one person is better off in A than in B. 
Just as states of the world can be traded off, values can be traded off against each other by 
examining how individuals rank them.
Welfarism is the approach generally used in economic analysis; for example, see 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) in the context of taxation and Dreze and Stem (1987) in cost 
benefit analysis. Welfarism avoids libertarianism’s adherence to the supremecy of property
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rights in the face of individuals’ willingness to trade rights to property against rights to life. 
Unlike Griffin’s pluralism, it does not require the analyst to be informed about "the nature of 
the object of desire", only about people's preferences. For these two reasons, I adopt a 
welfarist view in my analysis of taxation and the family in Chapter 4. If there are reasons, 
perhaps arising from considerations of neutrality or liberty, for not intervening in family life, 
these can be compared with the efficiency and equity gains from such intervention within a 
welfarist framework.
33 Welfarism and Caring
Welfarism is not a simple solution. The various difficulties with welfarism are 
discussed at length in Sen (1982). Here I wish to discuss only one of the issues related to 
welfarism, namely, the treatment of interdependence between the well-being of different 
individuals.
According to welfarism, public policy aims to maximize the sum (or a weighted sum) 
of the welfares or utilities of individuals in society. One contributor to an individual’s welfare 
is the well-being of those for whom he cares. Yet we find ourselves in a quandry if we 
attempt to incorporate such interdependence into the social welfare function. If the social 
welfare function respects people’s caring for each other, more resources will be allocated to 
the selfish, who care only about their own consumption, and less to the unselfish, who derive 
satisfaction from the consumption of others, if asymmetries exist in the degree of caring of 
individuals for each other. Yet social justice is frequently thought to require impartiality 
which "excludes favoritism based on friendship, similarity of race or class, and so on" (Barry, 
1989, p. 290). Whether or not social welfare should consider interdependence of well-being 
has been the subject of an extensive debate. The reasons which may be given for excluding
interdependence of well-being are impartiality and equality (Dworkin, 1977). Against 
excluding interdependence is the argument that it is not m eaningful to differentiate between 
alternative sources of well-being (Griffin, 1986). Indeed, most economic analyses male? no 
such distinction (see, for example, Hochman and Rodgers, 1969).
Impartiality is one reason for wishing to exclude utility interdependence. An example 
of a model which follows this reasoning is Sen (1966). Sen considers caring in die context 
of a cooperative enterprise. Each family in the enterprise has an egocentric (family-centric) 
utility function U* defined over income (y*) and labour (1^:
Vf*V(yM  U,>0, U:<0, Un<Q. Un<0, 3.1
Each family also has a "sympathetic” welfare function, which is a weighted sum of the 
utilities of each family in the cooperative:
a ^ l ,  OSa^l 32
The sympathetic welfare function is the family’s objective function, that is, each family is 
assumed to try to maximize its own welfare. Social welfare is an aggregate of the individual 
utility functions 3.1:
3 3
Sen, in commenting on the social welfare function 3 3 , notes that people adhering to it will 
be non-discriminating. Being non-discriminating requires that caring be ignored.4
Sen is not the only writer to have excluded forms of utility interdependence from a 
welfarist analysis. Harsanyi (1977) makes an exception to his principle of acceptance, which 
states that the utility of individual j is defined in terms of his own personal preferences, in
4Although in Sen’s analysis including caring would not change the social welfare function, as 
is assumed that there is symmetric good will, that is, is equal for every family i.
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the case of sheer hostility, malice, envy, and sadism. ”[H]uman sympathy can hardly require 
that i should help sadists to cause unnecessary human suffering" (1977, p.62). The moral 
point of view is that of "a sympathetic but impartial observer" (p. 49). Human sympathy 
requires ignoring some forms of utility interdependence.
Egalitarianism is, according to Dworkin (1977, p. 275), "the principal source of the 
great appeal that utilitarianism has had, as a general political philosophy, over the last 
century". If a utilitarian philosophy is not egalitarian it has little appeal within Dworkin’s 
framework. Interdependence in well-being may well lead to inequality. Given the individual 
welfare function 3.2 above the sum total Wft-Wj is maximised by an allocation of 
consumption, x*, at which:
dut dUj
3.4
Suppose that there are no intrinsic difference between the individuals, so they have identical 
utility functions, and, moreover, that both have diminishing marginal utility of income. If 
individual i receives more sympathy than he gives (a^a^), then he must have a lower 
marginal utility of consumption in order for 3.4 to hold, which will be obtained only if he 
enjoys a higher level of consumption. By the same reasoning, an individual j who cares more 
for others than they care for her receives, at the welfare maximizing allocation, less income. 
Inequality results from the interdependence of people’s well-being. Accordingly, "the fact that 
a policy makes the community better off in a utilitarian sense would not provide a
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justification compatible with the light of those it disadvantages to be treated as equals"
(Dworkin, p. 235). Yet with Dworkin’s analysis we have to provide a prior justification for
our commitment to egalitarianism, perhaps using some notion of rights.
There are a number of arguments which, in contrast to those based on impartiality and
equality, suggest that all preferences, whether personal or external, should be included in
welfare analysis. First, it is argued that the distinction between preferences over one’s own
consumption and preferences over other's consumption is not meaningful. Indeed Sen (1982,
p. 92) makes the point that
It can be argued that behaviour based on sympathy is in an important sense 
egoistic, for one is oneself pleased at others' pleasure and pained by others’ 
pain, and the pursuit of one's own utility may thus be helped by sympathetic 
action (Sen, 1982, p.92).
Perhaps what ultimately matters is people's well-being, not the source of that well-being. A
second argument attacks the claim that egalitarianism requires us to ignore well-being
interdependence. Griffin (1986, p.24) gives an example which illustrates how interdependence
is compatible with utilitarianism's main claim to being egalitarian, namely, Bentham’s
doctrine that everybody is to count for one: "A father's happiness can be at stake in his
child’s happiness - two persons’ welfare riding on one person's fate. Allowing that is no
violation of everybody counting for one; it merely allows the father, like everyone else, also
to count for one." Egalitarianism requires, in a utilitarian framework, equality in well-being.
The if and hows of incorporating interdependence in well-being into a welfarist
framework have been the subject of much debate, and it is a debate that we can only survey
in this chapter, not resolve. Our ultimate aim is to go beyond this debate into the realm of
concrete policy analysis. There is a way of going forward into applications without resolving
the various rlawng to impartiality and equality of the ignoring interdependence and the
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incorporating interdependence approaches. This way is the subject of section 3.4.
3.4 A social welfare function
Li practice, we can avoid making a prior commitment to either achieving impartiality 
by ignoring the interdependence of people’s well-being or respecting all preferences, selfish 
or unselfish. This is done by using a general formulation of the social welfare function:
F = bhUt + bwi r  1 ^ 2  3.5
The social welfare function, F, describes the ranking by society as a whole of various social 
states. The function U* is i’s egocentric utility function, which describes the pleasure an 
individual gets from her own consumption and leisure. The parameter bt is die weight placed 
on by society on U\ Under certain conditions both the ignoring interdependence and the 
incorporating interdependence views can be represented as special cases of 3.5.
Suppose we wish to have a social welfare function which respects all preferences, 
selfish or unselfish. We may adopt a sympathetic social welfare function, S, in which social 
welfare is defined over individuals* sympathetic welfare functions, W .
S=2i-lljljWl 3.6
As in Sen (1966), Wi describes each individual's well-being including both concern about 
himself and others. The equation 3.6 will be equivalent to 3.5 when each individual’s well­
being is additively separable in the utility derived from their own consumption and die well­
being derived from other’s utility. When additive separability holds, an individual j ’s 
sympathetic welfare function is defined as a weighted sum of egocentric utility functions: 
W ^I^SfcU* sa= l, 0 < s^ l 3.7
The parameters represents one person’s concern about another. In terms of the social 
welfare function (F), sympathetic welfare means that b^l+ S ji).
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Impartiality in the form of ignoring interdependence in well-being can also be 
represented as a special case of 3.5. To achieve impartiality, we define social welfare as the 
sum of individuals’ egoistic utilities:
E=LT + U* 3 . 8
Equation 3.8 is equivalent to 3.5 with bw=bj=l. Each person’s egoistic preferences have equal 
weight. The formulations 3.6 and 3.8 will be equivalent (up to a scalar) when there is 
symmetric goodwill, that is shw=swfa. Both are special cases of the more general social welfare 
function.5 
Conclusion
Welfarism provides a coherent framework for analysing the tax treatment of the 
family. It allows us to recognise government goals of neutrality, and to trade these off against 
considerations of efficiency and equity. Hie major difficulty encountered in using a welfarist 
approach to analyse the family is the treatment of interdependence between individual well­
being. There are persuasive arguments for excluding interdependence, based on impartiality 
and egalitarianism, and also arguments against, drawing upon the notion that it is meaningless 
to separate sources of human satisfaction. Rather than try to resolve the issue for once and 
for all, it is possible to use a general social welfare function which represents either the sum 
of egoistic utility or depends upon sympathetic welfare. With this social welfare function, we 
can proceed to an economic analysis of government policy towards the family.
5It may be noted that, with the sympathetic social welfare function, the government is indifferent 
to the amount of inequality in welfare between the spouses, and with the egocentric social welfare 
function, to inequality in utilities. This does not mean that the government is indifferent to inequality 
in consumption. However, a transformation of the social welfare function which increases social 
aversion to inequality and, at the same time, retains the additive separability property of the social 
welfare function, is equivalent to a transformation of each spouse’s welfare function.
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Chapter 4
Optimal Tax Treatment of the Family
The optimal tax treatment of the family is of major importance in the structure of taxation. 
Questions which arise in public policy discussions are: Should a husband and wife face the 
same marginal tax rate? Does it matter which family member receives tax credits or family 
allowance payments? The answers to these questions depend upon how families operate. Do 
families, at least as a first approximation, act like a single individual? How complementary 
or substitutable are husband and wife's earnings? Is the outcome of family decision making 
less equal than an egalitarian policy maker would wish?
Taxation of the family has received a limited amount of attention in the optimal 
taxation literature. Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) derive an optimal tax structure for the 
family under the assumption that there exists a single family utility function. They make a 
significant contribution by finding optimal tax rates for married men and married women, and 
the optimal structure for a progressive linear income tax when there is more than one 
household. Apps and Rees (1988) expand on Boskin and Sheshinski's analysis in three 
respects. First, Apps and Rees allow for household production. Second, lump-sum transfers 
are given to each individual, rather than to the family as a unit. Third, their model permits
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dissonance between society’s preferences over individual family members’ consumption and 
the family's preferences. The model developed in this chapter complements the work of 
Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) and Apps and Rees (1988). We consider households which 
maximize a single utility function, those discussed by Boskin and Sheshinski, as a special 
case. However, like Apps and Rees, we allow an element of dissonance between the 
preferences of policy makers and the household head, which results in a change in policy 
prescriptions.
The aim of this chapter is to bring together the literature on the economics of family 
decision making (Leuthold, 1968; Becker 1974a,b, 1981a,b; and Ulph, 1988) and the optimal 
taxation literature. In the model of family decision making which I will be using, the 
behaviour of the family will depend on the relative endowments of family members. The 
family will maximize a single utility function only when one family member is well-off 
enough to induce others maximize his welfare through his altruistic behaviour. The family 
utility function will then be that of the altruistic household head. Section 4.1 describes the 
model of family decision-making.
If the policy maker has preferences over the well-being of individual family members 
which differ from those of the household head, or if no family member is well-off enough to 
impose his preference on others, maximization of social welfare involves more than 
maximizing the well-being of the head of the household. Accordingly, results derived in the 
previous optimal taxation of the family literature must be modified. Section 4.2 considers the 
derivation of an optimal linear income tax using the model of family decision making 
developed in section 4.1.
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When no one family member is sufficiently well-off to impose his preferences on 
others, we can no longer assume that the family maximizes a single utility function. In 
certain of these cases, individuals’ demand functions have almost none of the standard 
properties (Ulph, 1988, p.40). Optimal tax analysis is far from straightforward. In section
4.3 we consider a benchmark case, namely optimal lump-sum transfers within the family, 
which sheds some light on the optimal policy in a more general case. The analysis illustrates 
the trade-off between equity and efficiency within the family.
4.1. A Model of Family Decision Making
The reactions of economic agents to changes in taxation policy will be predicted using 
the model of family decision making developed in Chapter 2. The two driving features of 
the model are that spouses care for each other, and derive benefits from goods that are public 
within the family.
In the model, spouses make three choices. First, they allocate the total time available 
to them (T) between leisure (L) and paid work (/). Second, they allocate their property and 
earned income (Rj+w$  between their own personal expenditures, p2Qi, and household 
expenditures, pjPj. Finally, one spouse may transfer an amount of his income to the other. 
These choices are limited by the individual budget constraint
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YrRi+wJrPA+P&**9
4.1
where (=-7^) is the net transfer from spouse i to spouse j.
A spouse’s preferences over his or her own consumption are represented by the egocentric 
utility function, IP, which depends upon the aggregate level of consumption of household 
goods (P=Pi+Pj), his personal consumption (Q), and leisure (Lj):
tf=U*(Li.Qi«; 4.2
This formulation requires that household goods are pure public goods and personal 
consumption is purely private. A person’s actions are guided by her preferences about her 
own consumption and her caring for her spouse. Her objective is to maximize her welfare 
function, W \ where
S-1 , OfSs^l 4.3
The welfare function is a convenient way of representing the interdependence between 
spouses, and lends itself to normative analysis.
It may be seen from equations 4.2 and 4.3 that the household expenditures of one spouse 
enter into the other's welfare function. The wife’s expenditures on household goods will 
depend on how many household expenditures she expects her husband to make. In this 
chapter, I will assume that both spouses have Coumot-Nash conjectures about household 
expenditures, that is, each takes the other's behaviour as given.
The model, as outlined above, has three types of solutions (see Figure 3.3). At the 
interior solution, incomes are relatively equal, and so both spouses contribute to household 
expenditures. The spouses move from an interior solution to a "no-transfers" comer solution 
as the relative incomes of the spouses become more unequal. The better off spouse makes
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all the household purchases, and the less well-off spouse uses her income to finance her 
private consumption. Finally, when one spouse is sufficiently well-off relative to the other, 
and is concerned about her welfare, he transfers part of his income to her. The better off 
spouse purchases his private consumption goods and the household expenditures; the 
dependent spouse uses her income and the transfer received to purchase her private 
consumption.
The positive transfers solution is the case described in Becker’s (1974b, 1981a) 
"Rotten Kid Theorem". The presence of transfers reduces the two spouses’ budget constraints 
(4.1 with i=h,w) to a single budget constraint Each family member’s consumption depends 
on total family income, hence each maximizes family income. The resulting behaviour 
patterns maximize the well-being of the individual making the transfers.1
When there are no transfers from the high earning to the low earning spouse, die 
behaviour of the family can no longer be described by a single welfare function. It is difficult 
to make general predictions about the behaviour of families when there are no transfers. 
However, by placing certain restrictions on the form of spouses’ utility functions, we can 
make some progress.
Each spouse is assumed to maximize the welfare function 4.3 subject to the budget 
constraint 4.1. Suppose we assume that the utilities of both spouses are separable in 
household goods, P, and the lower income spouse’s private consumption (L*,QW). Given the 
structure of the welfare function 4.3, it follows that each spouse’s welfare function W  will 
be separable in (LW,QW) and (P^,Qh). Using standard results on the possibility of two stage
Bergstrom (1989) has given a number of examples in which the Rotten Kid Theorem fails to 
hold. The theorem holds in this model because the benevolent spouse’s welfare function respects the 
other spouse’s preferences.
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budgeting with the separability of utility functions (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, pp. 122-24) 
we can conclude that the wife’s leisure demand function, L*, may be written as:
Lw=Lw(Rw+wwT ,ww,p2) 4.4
The wife’s demand for leisure depends upon her own full income R„+wwT, the price of 
leisure, wWt and the price of private goods, p2, on which all her earnings are spent The 
household goods demand function can be written as:
P=P(Ril+whT,wh,p1 ,p2> 4.5
As the husband purchases all household goods, the demand for these goods depends upon his 
full income, the price of household goods p! and the prices of the other goods which he buys, 
leisure (wb) and private goods (p j. The demand functions will have the usual properties 
because they arise from what are, essentially, independent welfare maximization problems for 
the husband and the wife.
Since the wife’s utility depends upon both her consumption of household goods and 
her leisure, her indirect utility function may be written (substituting 4.4 and 4.5 into 4.2): 
Uw=lT(Rh,Rw,wh,ww,p1,p2)
Note that each spouse’s income enters the utility function separately, instead of in a single
total income term. The wife’s indirect utility function may be contrasted with that of her
husband:
Uh=Uh(Rh,wh,p1,p2)
The indirect utility of the higher income spouse depends upon his own income and on the 
prices of the goods he consumes, that is, leisure, household expenditures, and his private 
expenditures. These are the arguments of the household goods demand function 4.5, and
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because of the separability assumption made above, will be the arguments of the husband's 
demand for his own private consumption and leisure.
The equilibrium with no transfers between the spouses is straightforward to analyze 
because, given our separability assumptions, one spouse’s purchase decisions have no effect 
on the other spouse’s demands. At the interior solution, by way of contrast, we need to make 
strong assumptions to avoid complex interactions between the two spouses’ optimization 
decisions.
In the interior solution, each spouse contributes to household expenditures. The 
contributions effectively pool the spouses’ incomes, with two consequences. First, demands 
depend on total income, not the division of income between spouses. Second, any change in, 
say, one spouse's wage rate has more than one effect the other’s consumption. Usually one 
spouse’s decisions affect the other because of complementarity or substitutability between the 
spouses’ leisure. At the interior solution, however, there is a further indirect effect An 
increase in the husband’s wage will cause him to substitute away from leisure and toward 
buying more public goods, say. As his public goods expenditures increase, the wife will 
decrease her public goods expenditures and increase her demand for leisure or private 
consumption. Even if we assume away the usual sources of interdependence in spouses’ 
decisions using separability, indirect interdependence still remains. The one exception arises 
for welfare functions which produce constant budget shares, such as the Stone-Geary welfare 
function. We use the Stone-Geary example extensively below.
In the remainder of this chapter, we consider the optimal tax treatment of the family 
using the model outlined above. Section 4.2 derives an optimal linear income tax for the first 
two of the three solutions. Section 4.3 discusses optimal lump-sum taxes.
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4.2. Optimal Linear Income Tax
Optimal taxation analysis formulates the government’s problem in terms of achieving 
social welfare goals subject to given revenue requirements. The government’s problem, 
therefore, has three elements. The first is to predict the reactions of economic actors to and 
the effects on their well-being of changes in economic variables. We will predict these 
changes using the model of family decision making developed above in section 4.1. Next, 
the tax instruments available to the governments and its revenue requirements must be 
specified. The final stage is the specification of social welfare goals in the form of a social 
welfare function. The government’s tax instruments and policy goals are the subject of the 
first part of this section.
42.1 Tax instruments and policy goals
Many tax policies affect the family. This section focuses on income taxes, while 
section 4.3 considers lump-sum taxes. The reasons for limiting our attention to income and 
lump-sum taxes while ignoring commodity taxes are discussed in the Appendix. Lump-sum 
taxes are of interest because they are, a priori, the most efficient form of taxation. Income 
taxes are of interest for a number of reasons. Income taxes directly affect the division of 
income receipts between husband and wife so have, potentially, equity effects. Policy makers 
have considerable freedom to alter the marginal tax rates faced by family members, especially 
the tax rate faced by second earners at low income levels. Moreover, because income taxes 
distort labour supply decisions, the optimal choice of tax rate can contribute to economic 
efficiency.
The income tax instrument that we will consider is a flat-rale linear income tax. The 
linear income tax is simple to analyze yet allows us to answer such basic policy questions as
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whether a husband and wife should face the same marginal tax rate. We discuss the most 
straightforward case which still permits interesting analysis, that is, the choice of flat rate 
taxes on husband and wife’s incomes for a single, representative family.
With a linear income tax the tax rate on spouse i’s income be given by a constant tj. 
The government’s revenue constraint is:
thWh/h + t*w X  = Ro 4.6
The terms w^ represent each individual’s earnings, that is, their wage rates times their labour 
supply. The interpretation of 4.6 is that the revenue raised by taxation, each individual’s tax 
rate multiplied by their earnings, must be equal to R ,^ the revenue required by government 
Normalizing so that wh=ww=l, and letting w^l-t^B*, the after tax wage rate, we can rewrite 
the government’s budget constraint 4.6 as:
/w + /h = Ro + JU , + BA 4.7
The government’s problem is to satisfy its budget constraint with the minimum reduction in 
efficiency and equity.
Efficiency and equity considerations are represented by the government’s social 
welfare function. We assume that all families are identical, and so the social welfare function 
can be defined over the well-being of members of a representative family.
F = W“ + blT  4.8
For the case in which one spouse is dependent upon the other, the family’s behaviour is 
described by W \ the welfare of the higher income spouse, assumed to be the husband. By 
incorporating IT  as well as W \ the social welfare function 4.8, like Apps and Rees (1988), 
permits dissonance between the preferences of the policy maker and those of the household
head. The policy maker may put more or less weight (b>0 or b<0) on the dependent spouse’s 
utility than does the household head.
Combining 4.7 and 4.8 we have the policy maker’s objective function:
The government’s objective, as represented in 4.9, is to maximize social welfare subject to 
its revenue constraint. Which tax structure best satisfies this objective will depend upon 
individuals’ reactions to government policy. We will, therefore, need to consider separately 
each family type, beginning with those headed by a Beckeiesque effective altruist, and going 
on to those where the lower income spouse is no longer directly dependent on the altruist 
4 2 2  Optimal taxation when the family maximizes the heads welfare
Optimal taxation when the family maximizes the head's welfare is the easiest case to 
analyze, as the family’s behaviour is described by W \ the welfare function of the household 
head. Let us redefine W* as the indirect welfare function of the husband, that is, 
Wh=Wh(R,15,p) where R is the vector of property incomes, B is the vector of after tax wage 
rates, and p is the vector of commodity prices. We can then write the first order conditions 
for maximizing the government’s objective function 4.9 with respect to the wife's after tax 
wage rate as:
where Xi is the i’th element of vector X, where X=(LW,QW,P).
Since the function W* represents the well-being of the household head, as well as 
describing the family’s behaviour, we can use standard results to reduce 4.10 to a more
L = F + |x[/w + /h - Rq - Bw/w * Bh/J 4.9
3L d W"
4.10
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manageable form. Optimization on the part of the household head gives us Roy’s identity, 
that is, 3Wh/3Bw=a(T-Lw), where a  is the marginal value of property income to the wealthier 
spouse.2 The Slutsky equations for changes in own income and for changes in spouse’s 
income are given by:
a/. a/.
‘' W,A
where M is the family’s money income. Hie term is the change in i’s labour supply 
induced by a change in j ’s net wage rate. An increase in own wage rate, all else held 
constant, causes a substitution away from leisure towards labour supply, so S^O. The cross­
effects S^, Shw may be either positive or negative, as one spouse’s leisure complements or 
substitutes for the other. Substituting the above conditions into 4.10 and rearranging gives:
4.11
If we take 4.11 and the equivalent expression for and solve we have
„ „ e„s», s*»^ .briavw i au\
4.12
2Since Wfa=Wh(RJ5,p) and R=-Bw(T-Lw)-Bh(T-Lh)+p1P+p2(Qw+Qh) the first order conditions for 
maximization of W* with respect to Bw are 0W h/8R)(3R/BBw)+(0Wh/9Bw)=O, from which the required 
condition can easily be derived.
108
Without the final term on the right hand side, expression 4.12 is equivalent to the condition 
derived by Boskin and Sheshinski (1983). It is optimal for the husband and wife to face 
equal marginal tax rates if
(Sww+Shw)/^ w=(Shh+Swh)//h. 4.13
Equal tax rates are optimal if the substitution effects induced by a change in the wife’s net 
wage rate relative to her labour supply are equal to the substitution effects relative to labour 
supply for a change in the husband’s wage rate. Since the efficiency losses caused by 
taxation are due to substitution effects, the condition is saying that equal tax rates are optimal 
when the relative efficiency losses are equal for both spouses. In general, one would not 
expect equal tax rates to be optimal. If tax rates are equal then, because we have normalized 
so that ww=wb=l, we can multiply through 4.13 by the wage rate w and, noting that Sj^sS,*, 
rewrite 4.13 as
*1 hh+^  kw
4.14
It is optimal for spouses to face equal marginal tax rates if the sum of own and cross price 
elasticities of substitution are equal for both spouses. In fact, Apps and Savage (1989) 
estimate the compensated own wage elasticities as 0.0714 for males and 0.1201 for females. 
With the elasticity for females being almost twice the elasticity for males, the case for equal 
tax rates seems far from convincing.
The final term on the right hand side of expression 4.12 results from the divergence 
between the policy maker’s preferences and those of the household head. Taking this 
divergence into account has an ambiguous effect on after tax wage rates. Suppose, initially,
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that so that the right hand side of 4.12 is positive. 3 If the last term in 4.12 is
positive, then taking it into account increases the right hand side of the equation, and the 
wife's after tax wage rate Bw must fall (and Bj, rise) to achieve the optimal tax. That is, a 
decrease in the wife's after tax wage rate is required to reduce intra-household income 
inequality if
0 u w/aBw)d//w)<0ir/aB h)(i//h) 4 . 1 5
Condition 4.15 is more likely to hold if the husband works few hours and the wife works 
many or if a decrease in the wife's wage rate induces the household to substitute towards 
goods the wife values more than a decrease in the husband's wage rate would. For example, 
a fall in the wife’s wage rate would induce the household to substitute towards wife’s leisure 
away from other goods, possibly making the wife better off.
It is difficult to determine whether 4.15 holds in general. A change in either wage 
rate may trigger a number of substitution effects, depending on the patterns of substitutability 
in the household head's welfare function. We can, however, abstract from complex 
substitution effects by supposing that family members have Stone-Geary welfare functions of 
the form:
Wi=2 kl^ jsik[Blklog(P-P’)+B2iclog(Qk-Qk')+B3klog(Lk-Lk')], 2 ^ = 1
In this case it can be shown that taking special account of the wife’s utility always leads to 
a reduction in the wife’s after tax wage rate. Condition 4.15 can be shown to be equivalent 
to requiring that
-(l-B3h)B3Wwh(T-U0-(l-B3w)^hWw(T-Lw')-B3^3h(PiP,+P2(Qw,- ^ ,))<0 4.16
3Recall that Sy is the substitution effect of a change in j's  net wage on i's labour supply. We 
would expect unless the husband's and wife's leisure were strongly complementary, and also
we would expect lh>lw, so the assumption SWW//W>Swj//fa is reasonable.
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Clearly 4.16 always holds. The reason we get the result expressed in equation 4.16 is, in fact, 
quite straightforward. Using the Stone-Geary welfare function eliminates any complications 
arising from the substitutability or complementarity of either spouse’s leisure or other goods. 
All that remains is one effect The wife's earnings all go into the general household pool 
from which consumption purchases are made according to the husband's preferences. A rise 
in the wife’s wage rate may have some effect on total household income - but the magnitude 
of that effect may not be large, as the government will lower the husband’s wage rate to 
maintain its revenue. Even if the increase in the wife’s wage does increase household 
income, only as much as the husband desires will go towards her consumption. At the same 
time, an increased wage rate makes the wife’s leisure more expensive, and so the household 
substitutes away from her leisure and towards other goods. Hence she is no better off.
What are we to make of these results? Do we conclude that the fact that women in, 
say, the U.S. face a higher marginal tax rate than Boskin and Sheshinski's estimates suggest 
they should represents a concern on the part of enlightened policy makers for the well-being 
of women? Or do we think that there might be something wrong with the model that we 
have been using so far? I would tend to favour the latter conclusion. The key assumption 
which ensures that the family maximizes the well-being of the household head is that the 
household head supports the other family member. The dependent family member’s earnings 
are not enough to reduce the support by the household head to zero. In fact, one can easily 
imagine situations where this would not be the case. A dependent spouse might get more 
income from a part-time job than she ever received in transfers from the higher earning 
spouse. All of this suggests the need to try to expand our model to more than rotten kids and 
rotten spouses.
4 2 3  No transfers between spouses
If the lower income spouse does not receive any income transfers from the higher
immediate consequence: her welfare may be increased (or, perhaps, decreased) by policies 
which increase her income at the expense of her husband’s income. Perhaps section 4.2.2’s 
recommendation of raising tax rates on second earners will no longer hold.
The optimal tax rates will be those that maximize the government’s objective function 
4.9. The first order conditions for social welfare maximization are given by 4.10, as in 
section 4.2.2:
To put equation 4.10 into a form that is a bit more revealing, we need to note two relations.
and those her husband purchases, her utility maximization is carried out independently of her 
husband’s decisions. It is a straightforward utility maximization problem. It follows, 
therefore, from the first order conditions for utility maximization, that 9Uw/9Bw=aw(T-Lw), 
where a* is the marginal utility to the wife of her own income. Secondly, we have
earning spouse, her welfare no longer depends upon total family income. This has an
4.10 (repeated)
Both of the relations derive from the observation that, because (by assumption) transfers
between spouses are zero and the wife’s well-being is separable in the goods she purchases
Equation 4.17 is simply the usual Slutsky equation for labour supply, with S „  being the 
substitution effect of a change in the wife’s wages on her labour supply.
Substituting the above two relations into 4.10, noting that dydfiw=0 and 
3Wh/dBw=shw3Uw/8Bw gives:
a (s. +b) dl
4.18
Equation 4.18 can be contrasted to equation 4.11, the condition which gives the optimal tax 
rate for the wife when the family maximizes the husband's welfare. First, note that the cross­
price effect of the wife's wage rate on the husband's income enters into the first optimal tax 
condition but not the second, which is not surprising given that the assumptions we have 
made about substitution effects combined with the absence of income transfers ensure that 
3lh/3Bw=0. However, an implication of the absence of cross-price effects is that, in the no­
transfers equilibrium, the optimal tax rate for the wife only interacts with the husband's 
optimal tax rate via the parameter measuring the tightness of the government’s revenue 
constraint, p~ The independence of the two tax rates is seen again in the optimal condition 
for the husband's tax rate.
The optimal tax rate for the husband is derived in the same way as the optimal tax 
rate for the wife. The first order conditions for maximization of social welfare with respect 
to Bj, are parallel to those given in 4.10. The term dWVBBh is equal to 3Uh/3Bb+shw3Uw/9Bh.
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Roy’s identity, as before, gives 3Uh/9Bh=oth(T-Lh). The term SlTTSBh can be written more 
revealingly as (3Uw/3P)(3P/9Bh). The Slutsky equation (4.17) applies to the husband, for the 
same reasoning as held for the wife. We also have d l * / ^ ^  (see equation 4.4). Noting 
these relations we have the condition for the husband’s optimal tax rate:
s^+b dUwQP 5L
4.19
Equation 4.19 is similar in structure to the optimal tax condition for the wife, equation 4.18, 
but there are two differences between the equations which are worth noting. First, the 
marginal utility of income to the wife ( a j  in 4.18 is prefaced by the term (s^+b) while the 
marginal utility of income to the husband (a*,) in 4.19 is not The reason for this disparity 
is that the social welfare function which we are maximizing is F=Wh+bUw=Uh+(shw+b)Uw. 
If the social welfare function puts equal weight on both spouses’ utilities, shw+b will be equal 
to one. The second difference between the two conditions is that 4.19 contains the term 
(3Uw/3P)(3P/3fih). The wife’s well-being is indirectly effected by changes in the husband’s 
tax rate via changes in his level of public goods purchases. It is not obvious from equation
4.19 whether the externality generated by the husband’s public goods purchases should result 
in an increase or decrease in his tax rate.
We can see the impact of the public goods externality on the husband’s tax rate more 
clearly by solving 4.19 for the tax rate, 1-B^ :
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a  s') ‘h (i — ) Skw+b duwap fik>~ dijdjshK » noyaA) ap%
4.20
The last term in equation 4.20 represents the social evaluation of the benefits to the wife 
generated by the change in purchases of P induced by a change in the husband's wage rate. 
The term may be either positive or negative, depending on whether 3P/9Bb and d l j d are 
positive or negative (the term (shw+b)(3Uw/9P) is always positive). If the labour supply curve 
is not backwards bending and if household expenditures are normal and not too 
complementary with leisure, then both dP/dfib and will be positive. In this case, a rise 
in the after tax wage rate (compared to the level calculated without taking into account 
interdependence between spouses) increases the husband's labour supply and household goods 
purchases (P). The increased expenditures make the wife better off, hence social welfare is 
improved by a decrease in the husband’s tax rate.
For the no transfers case, then, we have one result which is parallel to that derived 
when the household maximizes the head's welfare function: the primary earner receives what 
is, in a sense, preferential tax treatment The reason for the result in the no transfers case is 
that the husband's household purchases generate an externality from which the wife benefits. 
In the positive transfers case, however, the motivation for the result was that raising the wife's 
tax rate would induce her to take more leisure.
The results derived so far tend to suggest that after tax wage differentials are not such 
a bad thing. Perhaps we should ask: how much equality within the household is desirable? 
One way of answering this question is to leave the realm of the second best and consider the
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degree of equality that would be desirable if we could implement lump-sum transfers within 
the household. Section 4.3 considers lump-sum taxes and transfers.
43. Lump-sum taxes and transfers
In this section we will examine what level of lump-sum transfers between family 
members the government would impose if its aim was to maximize social welfare. The taxes 
considered are redistributive in that they redistribute income within die household to improve 
efficiency and equity. The government’s revenue requirement is nil, and no money is taken 
out of the household. To simplify the analysis, we consider one representative household, 
which is assumed to behave according to the model outlined in section 4.1.
In designing a system of lump-sum taxes and transfers, we need to consider 
government policy at each of the three equilibria: no transfers comer, positive transfers and 
interior solutions. We will begin with the no-transfers comer solution, that is, when one 
spouse is at a comer with respect to household expenditures, but does not receive a transfer 
from the other spouse. For this solution, we can use differential calculus to find the optimal 
transfer. In the other two equilibria, small externally imposed transfers can be completely 
offset by either a reduction in the voluntary transfer from one spouse to another, or by 
compensating increases and decreases in each spouse’s household expenditures.
The social welfare maximizing transfer, 7t°, will be the one which maximizes the 
social welfare function F=bhVh+bwVw subject to the constraint that the transfer given by the 
better off spouse is equal to the one received by the less well-off spouse. Since transfers are 
made in the form of income, we need to rewrite F as a function of the family members’ 
indirect utility functions. If, for families in which the husband is the better off spouse,
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preferences are separable between the commodity groups (Qw, L*) and (P,Qh,Lh), then the 
social welfare function F becomes:
F=bhVh(pAi) + b
where V* is spouse i ’s indirect utility function and \  is spouse i ’s full income. Note that the 
indirect utility of the wife depends on the income of the husband because she benefits from 
his household expenditures.
The effect of a transfer n  from husband to wife is to decrease \  to and to 
increase I* to 1^ +71. The optimal transfer is such that:
. dVk . 9V^ • BVW 
* 37* + w a / /  " dlw
4.21
The right hand side of equation (4.21) is the marginal social evaluation of the wife’s income, 
that is, the marginal contribution to the wife’s utility of increases in her income, weighted by 
society’s valuation of her welfare. The left hand side is the marginal social evaluation of the 
husband’s income. A transfer from husband to wife will be optimal if the marginal social 
evaluation of the wife’s income is greater than the husband’s (providing there is diminishing 
marginal utility of income). The properties of the optimal transfer can be described more 
precisely using a specific example, to which we will now turn.
An example: Stone-Geary Welfare Function
The Stone-Geary welfare function is given by: 
Wi=Sk^ s J B ,J o g (P -P > iy o g (a ^ > M o g (L l-Lk’)]> 2 ^ = 1  4.22
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where X*’ is spouse i’s subsistence expenditure on good X, P is a public good, Qi is i’s 
private consumption and L* is her leisure. At a no-transfers comer solution, the husband’s 
indirect utility function is given by
VhC=logIh + B^logCVpj) + VogCVPz) + BsJogCaaj/Wh) 4.23
where alh=(Blh+shwBlw)/(l+shwBlw), is the share of household expenditures (net of subsistence 
requirements) in spouse h’s budget or the weight placed on household goods relative to all 
goods that the husband consumes in his welfare function, and 3^= BaAl+ShiAw) is the budget 
share of private expenditures. The variable ^  is the husband’s full supernumerary income, 
that is full income (whT) less the expenditure necessary to meet subsistence requirements 
(PiP’+PaQh’+WhV), while I** is full supernumerary income, with all subsistence requirements 
except those for public goods deducted. The wife’s indirect utility function is given by: 
V’c=Blwlog(all/p l) + B2wlog(a,2w/P2) + B3wlog(a‘3W/ww)
+ B^oglk + (B^+BaJlogC 4.24
where *s t l^e s*13*6  wife’s income going to her private expenditures
or the weight placed on private goods relative to all the goods she purchases in her welfare 
function.
Some calculation shows that the optimal transfer, is given by: 
bw(l-Biw)Ifa >
7t°=_____________________  4.25
b . + bh
The transfer is an increasing function of the income of the better off spouse, the husband in 
this example, and a decreasing function of the wife's income. If the wife’s preference for 
public goods, filw is large, the optimal transfer will be small, as it will be more efficient to 
increase her well-being indirectly with public goods purchases. The optimal transfer is
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increasing in bw, the weight placed on the wife’s utility in the social welfare function, and 
decreasing in bfa, the weight placed on the husband’s utility.
The optimal transfer will be positive if 7C°>0, which is equivalent to
— > where r -——
c  1 _ r
4.26
The numerator of the term r is the increase in social welfare with a unit change in loglj,, while 
the denominator is the sum of increase in social welfare with a unit change in logl^ and the 
increase with a unit change in logl/.
Condition 4.26 can be compared to the boundaries of the no-transfers comer solution 
which are, as in Figure 33, given by:
* k Cw
1^ 1_Cw
4.27
where k ^ l+ s^ jJ /C s^ + l) , and cw is the wife’s effective share of household income, given 
by cw=alw/(alw+alh-alwalh). When the right hand side inequality holds, the husband is no 
longer m aking a voluntary transfer to his wife, when the left hand side inequality holds, the 
wife is making no contribution to household expenditures.
Is r/(l-r) from equation 4.26 less than or greater than c„/(l-cw)? If the former (Le., 
r<cw), then whenever we are at a no-transfers comer solution, the desired transfer will be
119
positive. If the latter (that is, i>cw), then there will be an income range in which one spouse 
will be dependent on the other, but the optimal transfer will be negative, that is, it will be a 
transfer to the spouse making the household expenditures. In fact, some calculation shows 
that i>cw if
b > - L - L  
w P« Pi»
4.28
Condition 4.28 will be fulfilled in the standard case in which l<bw<2, and the preferences of 
the spouses for household public goods are fairly similar. There will often be a range in 
which the optimal transfer is to the spouse making household expenditures. The explanation 
for this result is that, because we are at a Coumot-Nash equilibrium, there is underprovision 
of public goods. However, if income is transferred to the better off spouse, the level of 
public goods purchases increases, because the wealthier spouse spends money on public goods 
to increase his own utility and that of his partner. Initially, the welfare gains from the 
reduction of underprovision may well exceed the welfare losses from increased inequality. 
The exception occurs when the better off spouse cares little for his partner, and his 
preferences for household public goods are low, while the preference of the wife for 
household public goods is high, in which case filh, and bw are low, filw is high, and condition
4.28 is not fulfilled. The increase in public goods provision accompanying inequality is 
small, relative to the increase desired by the dependent spouse.
What are the effects of the transfer? The effect of an optimal transfer is to change 
the wife’s income level to:
V  + = (l-r)(Ih+ 0  4.29
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This can be compared to the boundary between the interior and no-transfers comer solution 
VKl-CwXV+U- The post-transfer income level will be less than the income level at which 
the wife begins to contribute to household expenditures if i>cw which, as before, requires 
condition 4.28 to hold.
Voluntary positive transfers
The optimal transfer was calculated assuming that the spouses were at a no-transfer 
comer solution, that is, one spouse was making all the household expenditures, while the 
other only financed her own consumption. The transfer so calculated is a global maximum 
over the whole no-transfers comer income range. This can be seen by noting that 92F/9ti^<0 
throughout the range. But how does the optimal transfer compare with die transfer made 
voluntarily at the positive transfers solution, where one spouse is completely dependent on 
the other?
It can be shown, as in Figure 4.1, that there is no discontinuity in the spouses’ indirect 
utility functions at the boundary between the positive transfers and the no-transfers comer 
solution (V/CV+V)). Social welfare is the same at some point within the positive transfers 
region, such as A, as it is at the boundary between the no-transfers and positive transfers 
solutions. Since social welfare is increased by making a transfer from husband to wife which 
moves them from I^/CV+V) to social welfare would also be increased by
moving all individuals making voluntary transfers to the optimal, post-transfer income levels.
Government imposed transfers sufficient to change the wife’s income to 4.29, the 
social welfare maximizing level, are shown by line TT in Figure 4.2. The optimal transfer 
as a fraction of total household income is the distance between the wife’s actual share of 
household income, as shown by say point A, and her share which maximizes social welfare
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Iw7(Iw°+Ih0)* The transfer can be broken up into two parts. The first reallocates income to 
C /C C + t1). that is, it imposes a sufficiently large transfer that voluntary transfers are reduced 
to zero. The second part is the movement to the optimal income level.
F igu re  4 . 1 :  U t i l i t y  and r e l a t iv e  incomes
U
I l +l} I °+ I°
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Interior solution
Figure 4.2 shows two optimal transfer curves. These correspond to the two social 
welfare maximizing outcomes, 1*7(1*°+ ,^°) and [Iw7(Iiro+lh0)]1« At the first of these outcomes, 
the husband makes all household expenditures, at the second, the wife makes all expenditures. 
At the interior solution, social welfare may be increased by moving to one of the two optimal 
income levels, but there is no a priori basis for choosing between the two.
The analysis of the optimal lump-sum transfer provides another example of the trade­
off frequently found in public finance between equity and efficiency. Equity would seem to 
require a move to the interior solution, but it is there that underprovision of public goods is 
most severe. Efficiency requires a move towards the positive transfers solution, where the 
household acts as one individual, and the problem of underprovision of public goods is 
minimized. The optimal income allocation represents a balance of efficiency and equity 
considerations.
Because the results derived here are driven by the framework of public goods and 
utility interdependence, they shed some light as to the desirability of "paternal" philanthropic 
behaviour, that is, the construction of public projects by wealthy altruists. The analysis 
suggests that, if the wealthy are altruistic enough, then the presence of inequality mitigates 
the underprovision of public goods. So, for example, in Britain, income inequality produces 
the Sainsbury Wing of the National Gallery. The efficiency of relying upon philanthropy 
depends crucially on how altruistic the altruists are. Moreover, the efficiency of philanthropy 
needs to be compared with alternative means of mitigating underprovision, such as 
government intervention.
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F ig u re  4 . 2 :  Optimal tr a n s fe r  cu rves
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Conclusions
When beginning this analysis, I expected that an economic analysis which took 
account of both the possibility of conflict between caring family members and valued each 
individual family member’s well-being would advocate a lowering of tax rates on secondary 
earners and transfers to dependent family members.
The first of these expectations had no support from the analysis. Valuing each family 
member’s well-being requires us to raise the rate of tax on secondary earners, and thereby 
encourage them to enjoy more leisure. The second of the expectations had somewhat more 
support Transfers to a dependent spouse may increase social welfare. However, the benefits 
of increased equality must be set against a loss in efficiency as the extent of underprovision 
of household goods increases. The feature of the model which drives this last result is that 
there is no mechanism to enforce cooperative behaviour within the family, so family members 
ffee-ride, with the extent of free-riding depending on the degree of caring between family 
members.
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Appendix: Instruments for Government Tax Policy
In this chapter, we aimed to discover what system of taxes and transfers led to the 
social welfare maximizing distribution of household income. In redistributing household 
income, the government has three tax instruments; commodity taxes, lump-sum taxes and 
transfers, and income taxes. These instruments were compared in the chapter on the grounds 
of equity and efficiency. This appendix asks whether any tax instrument be ruled out on the 
basis of administrative cost.
Commodity taxes may redistribute income between family members. First, goods 
which are age or sex specific, such as children's clothing, women’s clothing, or alcohol, can 
be taxed or subsidized to transfer income from adults to children or from men to women. 
Second, a good which is public within the household, such as housing, may be subsidized to 
encourage purchases which benefit all family members. Third, goods which are luxuries, and 
may be inferred to benefit better off family members, may be taxed. There are, however, a 
number of problems with implementing redistributive commodity taxes. First, it is not always 
clear which goods fall into which categories. This has two consequences. The first is 
administrative costs. For example, petite women's clothing is of a similar size to some 
children's clothing, and some teenagers fit adult sizes. In certain jurisdiction, such as British 
Columbia, where children's clothing is exempt from tax, individuals buying such clothing 
must sign a form stating the name and age of the child for whom the clothing is being 
bought. The second consequence of uncertainty is that the categorization of goods into 
various categories can become politicized. For example, the British government's decision 
in 1988 to recategorize crunchy cereal bars, thereby making them standard-rated for VAT 
purposes, made national news (Hills, 1988). A second problem with redistributive commodity
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taxes is that the benefits may not go to the intended group. For example, a subsidy on 
women’s clothing would benefit poor housewives to some extent, but would have 
disproportionate benefits for professional women making large expenditures on clothing. It 
would seem to be more straightforward to use lump-sum taxes and transfers or the income 
tax system to redistribute family income.
Lump-sum transfers between family members are, a priori, the most efficient method 
of redistributing household income. As such, they provide a benchmark case. But besides 
being efficient, lump-sum taxes are, potentially, feasible. It is possible to imagine 
circumstances in which lump-sum transfers between family members might be imposed 
through taxation. For example, the Canadian federal government’s 1987 White Paper on Tax 
Reform suggested that individuals with a dependent spouse should be able to claim a tax 
credit of $850 per year (Cloutier and Fortin, 1989). There is no reason why the credit should 
not be paid to the dependent spouse, instead of being used to reduce the higher earner’s tax 
liability, apart from the administrative cost of putting a cheque in a separate envelope and 
affixing a stamp. A feasible scheme of lump-sum transfers between spouses may be nested 
within a system of income taxation. A second example of a lump-sum tax affecting 
household members on an individual basis is the community charge presently (in 1990) being 
implemented in England. All adults in a household are assessed and liable to pay die charge, 
even those, such as homemakers, not in receipt of any income (provided the homemaker’s 
spouse’s income is above a specified level). However, spouses are liable for each other’s 
charges. The implementation of the community charge will provide a test of whether or not 
it is feasible to tax individual household members on a lump-sum basis, and may highlight 
the need for a better understanding of the process of intrafamily income allocation.
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The structure of the income tax system affects the flows of income within the family. 
For example, consider the contrast between individual and joint taxation. Under a system of 
joint taxation, a couple’s tax liabilities are based on total earnings, and the lower earner faces 
the same marginal tax rate as the higher earner. The former’s after tax income is generally 
lower than under individual taxation, provided that the tax system is progressive and the tax 
revenue collected from each household is the same in both cases. Income taxation certainly 
redistributes the receipt of income between family members. Moreover, it does not suffer 
from certain of the disadvantages of commodity taxes. Money income entering a household 
is generally received by one spouse, particularly in the case of wage income, hence it is easy 
to identify whose money income is affected by a tax. It is also possible to identify a person 
as either the primary or the secondary earner, and tailor taxes accordingly.
The decision to focus the discussion of this chapter on income taxes and lump-sum 
taxes was made after consideration of the administrative costs of commodity taxes, lump-sum 
taxes, and income taxes. Commodity taxes may well redistribute income within the 
household, particularly from adults to children, but it is administratively costly to categorize 
goods, and the benefits of lower taxes on goods consumed by women or children may go 
disproportionately to high income women or children, if the subsidized items are normal or 
luxury goods. Accordingly, we decided to reject commodity taxes in favour of a detailed 
analysis of lump-sum and income taxes.
128
Chapter 5
Intergenerational Altruism 
and the Irrelevance of Redistribution 
in Rawls’ Original Position
Rawls* A Theory of Justice contains an account of justice between generations, the key to
which is intergenerational altruism.
...since it is assumed that a generation cares for its immediate descendants, as 
fathers say care for their sons, a just savings principle, or more accurately, 
certain limits on such principles, would be acknowledged (p. 288).
Concern for descendants motivates even the first generation, who reap no direct rewards from
any accumulation, to save.
Rawls* account of intergenerational justice has been criticized on a number of grounds.
Richards (1983, p. 138) argues against the assumption of concern for descendants: "To write
such assumption into the foundations of serious moral theory is to compromise the neutral
theory of the good with a specifically modem romanticism about child-rearing". Some
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question whether the Humean circumstances of justice, adopted by Rawls, apply to the 
problem of justice between generations (Barry, 1978, 1989; Richards, 1983). Barry (1977, 
p. 277) argues that the concern for descendants assumption fails to provide a basis for 
intergenerational justice in the presence of ecological sleeper-effects, that is, actions that have 
no effects for perhaps hundreds of years, and then catastrophic effects. An example might 
be the creation of toxic waste.
Yet despite extensive criticism, interest in Rawls’ account of intergenerational justice 
remains strong. The problem of justice between generations provides, as Rawls suggests 
(1971, p. 284), a severe test of any ethical theory. Rawls’ treatment of the problem brings 
out fundamental difficulties within his own theory. Moreover, Rawls’ account of 
intergenerational justice provides a starting point for other analyses of the difficult problem 
of justice between generations.
The problem of intergenerational justice as formulated by Rawls is one of choosing the 
amount to save for future generations. The first part of this chapter examines how choices 
are made by people in Rawls* original position. Three features of the choice problem are 
emphasized. First, people in the original position lack knowledge of their individual 
identities, because of the imposition of a "veil of ignorance". Second, individuals are guided 
by coherent set of preferences. They are rational Towards other members of their own 
generation they feel mutual disinterest; towards their descendants they feel concern. Finally, 
they have sufficient control over their bequests to future generations to enact their choices.
Given the nature of the choice problem, and concern for descendants strong enough to 
generate positive bequests, Rawls* intuition that intergenerational altruism guarantees 
intergenerational justice is correct. This is true even if there are ecological sleeper effects,
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if present generations can compensate future generations for environmental damage. The 
second part of the chapter gives an example of how people might choose a just savings 
schedule, and sets out the conditions under which they can overcome sleeper effects.
The original position is constructed so that "the deliberations of any one person are typical 
of all (Rawls, 1971, p. 263)." As Pateman (1988, p. 43) comments, "In effect, there is only 
one individual in the original position behind Rawls* *veil of ignorance*". Yet how is this 
construction to be justified? Rawls, (1971, p. 18) notes that "To justify a particular description 
of the initial situation one shows that it incorporates... commonly shared presumptions". One 
common presumption about social life is that society is made up of men and women who 
together have children.
The final part of this chapter examines the implications for Rawls* theory of modifying 
his framework to allow each child to have two concerned parents. The results are striking. 
Under conditions sufficient to enable individuals to overcome sleeper effects, income 
redistribution is irrelevant If the irrelevance of redistribution is accepted, we need to question 
Rawls* description of the background institutions for distributive justice (section 43). If the 
result is rejected, Rawls* account of intergenerational justice is called into question.
The arguments in this chapter draw from Barro’s (1974) proof of Ricardo’s proposition 
that government spending financed by debt has no real effects, applied in various contexts by 
Feldstein (1976), Carmichael (1982), among others, and recent criticisms of Barro’s work by 
Bemheim and Bagwell (1988) and Abel and Bemheim (1988). For much of this chapter, I 
follow these authors in assuming a neo-classical economy — production exhibits constant 
returns to scale, consumers and producers are perfectly informed, and no small group of firms
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or trade unions dominates any market. The assumptions of neo-classical economics, like 
Rawls* description of the original position, make the problem of justice tractable.
5.1 Intergenerational altruism and intergenerational justice
In A Theory of Justice moral principles, including principles for intergenerational justice, 
are reached by the unanimous agreement of rational individuals in an original position of 
equality. Rawls insures that agreements will be unanimous by removing from individuals all 
knowledge of their individual identity by imposing a "veil of ignorance". Individuals* choices 
can be predicted because their decisions are guided by "mutually disinterested rationality" in 
conjunction with concern for descendants.
Unanimous agreement in the original position is possible because the members of every 
generation are behind a ’veil of ignorance*. Each has no knowledge of his place in society, 
plan of life, or the particular circumstances of his society. Because all are equally ignorant, 
"the deliberations of any one person are typical of all (Rawls, 1973, p. 263)". The veil of 
ignorance alone, however, does not mean that each generation will act as one individual 
When deciding on the level of collective goods, such as savings for the future, many 
individuals acting in isolation may not choose the optimal level of provision. Rawls, 
following Sen (1961), calls this the isolation problem. In the original position, it is assumed 
that the isolation problem and the associated problem of assurance are overcome. This, 
together with the veil of ignorance, allows us to represent the collective choice of one 
generation as the choice of one individual.
The veil of ignorance means that an individual does not know his particular desires and 
interests. He only knows that, whatever these desires happen to be, he will be better able to 
fulfil them, the more "primary social goods" he has at his disposal. Primary social goods are
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rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, and income and wealth (Rawls, 1971, p. 92). 
To construct a single index which aggregates the three broad categories of primary social 
goods would be difficult. Therefore, I assume that any individual has the same fundamental 
liberties and opportunities. Power and income are assumed to be proportional to wealth.
Each person is concerned about his own index of primary social goods, and not about the 
levels of primary social goods enjoyed by others. Individuals are assumed to be in a position 
of "mutual disinterest". They take no interest in one another’s interest (Rawls, 1971, p. 128). 
Mutual disinterest does not mean that people are egoistic, only that each is concerned with 
pursuing his own, possibly altruistic, ends. People are indifferent to the amount of primary 
social goods enjoyed by their contemporaries.
An individual’s preference for more social goods rather than less can then be represented 
by an indirect utility function, relating his utility, V\ to his wealth, k,:
Y= Y(kJ dY/dk^O  5.1
The utility function summarizes the individual’s ranking or ordering of the options open to 
him. A person prefers more wealth to less, because he prefers more primary social goods to 
less. The utility function (5.1) expresses the postulate of mutual disinterest in that a person’s 
utility depends only on the resources available to him to pursue his ends. Other people’s 
income enters neither negatively, as it would if he were motivated by envy, or positively, as 
it would if he were motivated by benevolence. A person is "not moved by affection or 
rancor" (Rawls, 1971, p. 144).
An individual's ability to rank the options open to him follows from Rawls’ assumption 
that the representative individual is rational. He has:
1
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a coherent set of preferences between the options open to him. He ranks 
these options according to how well they further his purposes; he follows the 
plan which will satisfy more of his desires rather than less....(p. 143)
If the individual follows the plan which satisfies more of his desires rather than less, he can
be said to be maximizing his utility. His preferences can be represented in two ways. First,
as in equation (5.1), by describing the maximum satisfaction an individual can attain given
a certain level of primary social goods. A second, and equivalent, representation, links a
person’s satisfaction to the state of the world. For example, a person's satisfaction could be
linked to his own consumption and his descendant's well-being.
Concern for descendants is the motivation for saving in A Theory of Justice. Rawls
expands the assumption of concern for descendants as follows:
What is essential is that each person in the original position should care about 
the well-being of some of those in the next generation, it being presumed that 
their concern is for different individuals in each case. Moreover, for anyone 
in the next generation, there is someone who cares about him in the present 
generation (Rawls, 1971, pp. 128-9).
Having concern for others means caring about their well-being (Rawls, 1971, p. 128). A
person who cares for his descendant gets pleasure from his descendant's well-being as well
as from his own consumption. These preferences can be represented by saying that the direct
utility of the individual in the present generation, IP, depends positively on his descendant’s
well-being, V*1, and his own consumption ct:
iM j f e v * 1) auyav^x) 5.2
An individual's consumption is limited by his resources net of bequests to his descendant 
Rawls frames the problem of intergenerational justice in terms of the choice of a "just 
savings principle". By a just savings principle, I interpret Rawls as meaning a schedule 
assigning an appropriate rate of accumulation to each level of social advance which requires
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each generation to uphold and further just institutions (p. 289). If just institutions require 
primary social goods for their maintenance, the just savings principle requires individuals to 
uphold and further the stock of primary social goods which, when liberty has been achieved, 
involves the maintenance of wealth.
The interpretation of the just savings principle as a schedule specifying rates for the 
accumulation of wealth is not as narrow as it might first appear. A society’s wealth includes, 
for example, the infrastructure of roads and communication networks, and reserves of natural 
resources, as well as factories and houses. It would be possible to think of people’s education 
and skills as part of society’s human capital. Yet human capital differs from physical capital 
in that one generation does not simply bequeath human capital to the next. Human capital 
is acquired through experience and contact with others. To include human capital in society’s 
wealth would make the model more realistic, as income from capital would then include wage 
income. However, the transmission of physical wealth often requires conscious decisions and 
sacrifices on the part of initial generations, and therefore poses more interesting ethical 
problems than actions, such as passing on a language, which are largely beyond individual 
control. In this chapter, I wish to focus on forms of savings which people are able to vary 
freely.
The just savings schedule is decided by persons in the original position considering how 
much, at each stage of advance, they would be willing to save for their immediate 
descendants:
They [the persons in the original position] try to piece together a just saving 
schedule by balancing how much at each stage they would be willing to save 
for their immediate descendants against what they would feel entitled to claim 
of their immediate predecessors. Thus imagining themselves to be fathers, 
say, they are to ascertain how much they should set aside for their sons, by
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noting what they would believe themselves entitled to claim of their fathers 
(Rawls, 1971, p. 289).
Rawls does not discuss explicitly how individuals decide how much they are willing to save. 
Behind the veil of ignorance, social conventions cannot guide their decisions.
One way of representing an individual’s trade-off between his own consumption and his 
descendant’s well-being is to use the calculus of individual utility maximization or rational 
choice. This is the approach taken by Arrow (1973) and Dasgupta (1974) in their work on 
Rawls' just savings principle.1 An individual’s choices are limited by his wealth. He cannot 
bequeath more than his wealth, lq, less his consumption, ct. If there is no means to borrow 
from other generations, his wealth will be the bequest he received from the previous 
generation, plus any interest income, rtbul. His budget constraint is:
(l+rjb^ = ct + bt 5.3
A person’s utility (5.2) is maximized when the marginal cost of an additional pound 
bequeathed is equal to the marginal benefits:
M'd V M dkM
5.4
An individual's willingness to save is decided, on the one hand, by the cost of making a 
bequest to future generations, the decrease in an individual’s consumption (dUt/dct). This cost 
will be positive except for people who are so satiated that they are indifferent between 
consuming and throwing away goods. On the other hand, there are the benefits of saving.
1 Rawls does not welcome utility maximization. However, as Barry (1989) points out, Rawls’ 
rejection of an intergenerational application of the difference principle carries with it the notion that 
the gains to future generations from saving outweigh the losses of earlier, poorer, generations. There 
is a trade-off between the two.
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A descendant's well-being increases with his command over primary social goods. Indeed, 
if the descendant is extremely poor, the value to him of an increase in his wealth, dVt+1/dkl+1, 
will be extremely large, and on the very marginal of survival, will be infinite. The value of 
an increase in descendant's well-being to an individual in the present generation is determined 
by his concern for his descendant (5Ut/3Vt+1).
If a person is completely unconcerned about his descendant, so 3Ut/3Vt+1 is zero, there 
are no benefits to saving. Utility maximization would require that a person transfer wealth 
from his descendant to himself until he either reaches physical limits on the transfer of 
resources or is satiated. In the former case, condition (5.4) would not hold with equality, as 
an individual's utility could be increased if he could take more resources from his descendant 
In the later case, both sides of condition (5.4) would be equal to zero.
A person who has positive concern for his descendant will bequeath to him some wealth. 
One feature of this model is that a person has no wealth except his inheritance. An increase 
in the descendant's inheritance from zero to a survival level will cause an infinite increase in 
his well-being. If an individual places any value on his descendant's well-being, this increase 
would be sufficient to outweigh the costs of making a bequest, provided the bequest did not 
reduce the individual in the present generation to starvation.
Just savings requires more than just positive bequests; it requires that the stock of wealth 
be maintained from generation to generation. For just savings, concern needs to be 
"sufficiently strong" in order to outweigh the cost to an individual of giving up his own 
consumption. Less concern is needed to induce people to maintain wealth levels when 
interest rates are high or when the a person’s descendant is expected to be relatively badly 
off (and so have a relatively high marginal utility of income). More concern is needed to
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generate just savings when a person is poor, and suffers greatly from any decrease in his own 
consumption. In any case, just savings will be achieved providing that concern is sufficiently 
strong.
This section has attempted to set out conditions under which a just savings principle will 
be reached. The veil of ignorance allows for unanimous agreement. Mutually disinterested 
rationality enables people to choose between options available to them. Freedom to vary 
bequests to future generations permits people to enact their choices. Concern for descendants, 
if sufficiently strong, guarantees that a just savings principle, requiring each generation to 
uphold and further just institutions, will be acknowledged.
5.1.1 An example: Intergenerational justice and sleeper effects
So far it has been shown that people can arrive at a just savings schedule through rational 
choice, as represented by the outcome of utility maximization, provided certain conditions are 
fulfilled. Yet given Rawls* (1971, p. 287) rejection of "the calculus of advantages", there 
may be doubts as to the propriety of the rational choice approach. In this section I present 
an example of just savings as rational choice and argue that, when people act rationally and 
the other conditions for arriving at a just savings principle are fulfilled, ecological "sleeper 
effects" will be fully compensated for.
Consider, for example, a society where each generation’s trade-off between their own 
consumption and their descendants* well-being is described by the utility function:
U1 = 101ogct + lq+1 55
The interest rate is assumed to be 100 per cent, and the initial level of wealth 0 0  is £10. 
Utility maximization requires that each generation maintains their successor’s wealth at £10, 
by leaving a bequest of £5, and consumes £5, as shown in Figure 5.1.
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F ig u r e  1: S a v in g s ,  c o m p en sa tio n ,  and
e n v iro n m e n ta l  damage
£
timet t + 1 t + 2
■ cost of environmental damage
— “ —  - evolution of wealth without environmental damage 
_  . —  . evolution of wealth with environmental damage and compensation
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What happens to individuals* choices if we introduce ecological sleeper effects? For 
example, consider environmental damage which benefits the first generation £5, has no effect 
on immediate descendants, but costs the initial generation’s grandchildren £20. The cost of 
environmental damage to the third generation is equal to the benefits received from the 
damage by the first generation, compounded at the rate of economic growth, rt. This level 
of environmental damage is the level which the initial generation is just able to compensate 
for.
First, note that the course of action chosen before the possibility of environmental damage 
arose may still be pursued afterwards. The same level of consumption can be achieved by 
each generation - even when environmental damage occurs - if the initial generation increases 
its bequest enough to compensate for the damage, and the intermediate generation passes on 
the bequest Barry (1977, p. 277) recognizes that we can leave more to our remote successors 
by leaving more to our immediate successors. However, he argues "we take the risk that they 
simply blue the lot anyway". But will they?
Consider the decision of the intermediate generation. They receive compensation from 
the initial generation of £10. If they squander, say, £5 of the compensation, their 
consumption will be £10 and their descendants* wealth will be nil But the combination of 
£5 for their own consumption and £10 for their descendants* wealth was preferred to the 
alternative of £10 and nil before the possibility of damage arose. There is no reason why the 
intermediate generation should now want to consume more and leave a smaller net bequest 
to their children. The initial generation recognizes that the intermediate generation will pass 
on compensation, and so is able to pursue the consumption patterns previously chosen.
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The line of argument applies when damage is experienced by generation n, where n is a 
large number, instead of generation 3. If the first n-2 generations pass on compensation, the 
n-lth generation will, as not to do so would involve a departure from the optimal 
consumption choice. The n-2th generation will then pass on compensation, knowing that 
generation n-1 will do so, and so on. Sleeper effects do not prevent families from following 
a just savings principle.
A number of points about the argument used here are worth noting. First, in the 
pre-sleeper effects equilibrium, each generation voluntarily makes a positive bequest to its 
descendants. If the desired level of bequests was less than the actual level of bequests, in this 
example £5, a generation would effectively decrease its bequest to its descendants, by not 
passing on the full amount of the compensation. Acceptance of a just savings principle 
guarantees that positive bequests will be desired. Second, all individuals care about their 
descendants — one uncaring generation is enough to break the chain. Rawls explicitly 
assumes concern for descendants. Third, people are concerned with their descendants' overall 
wealth, not the size of their own bequest. This condition insures that the intermediate 
generation, say, views leaving a bequest of £25, part of which compensates for environmental 
damage of £20, as equivalent to a bequest of £5. Rawls does not eliminate explicitly the 
possibility that people care about the components of the bequest their descendants receive. 
However, it could be argued that this possibility is eliminated by the assumption of absence 
of affection or rancor, for these are the sort of sentiments which would make a person 
concerned about the components of a bequest. Fourth, people’s decisions are made by 
rational choice — in the example given, by maximizing utility function (5.5). Rationality is 
explicitly assumed by Rawls. These conditions reappear in the discussion of the irrelevance
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of redistribution. The irrelevance results emerge when a more complex family structure is 
incorporated in the original position.
5.2 Family Structure in the Original Position
The concern for descendants assumption made by Rawls presupposes a certain type of 
family structure. It may be recalled that Rawls (1971, p. 128-29) requires that "each person 
in the original position should care about the well-being of some of those in the next 
generation, it being presumed that their concern is for different individuals in each case" 
[emphasis added]. Each person in the next generation has only one person caring for him in 
the previous generation.
One family structure which permits concern for descendants in the form Rawls describes 
is shown in Figure 5.2. The negotiators in the original position (shown in the inner circle) 
are thought of as "heads of families" (p. 128). Each has a son, shown in the next circle out, 
who in turn has his own son (indicated by arms for families 1 and 2). The assumption of 
concern for descendants means that "a generation cares for its immediate descendants as 
fathers...care for their sons" (p. 288). Successive father-son links make up chains or, as 
Rawls puts it, "continuing lines of claims" or "deputies for a kind of everlasting moral agent 
or institution" (p. 128).
It is possible to think of three circumstances under which a family structure as described 
by Rawls would exist. First, if women (or men) in some sense did not matter. For example, 
parents might have no concern for daughters (or sons). Alternatively, women (or men) might 
not be allowed to hold property. However, the liberty principle implies that gender 
differences in basic rights must be justified on the ground that they benefit the restricted sex. 
As Rawls writes "if, say, men are favored in the assignment of basic rights, this inequality
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is justified...only if it is to the advantage of women and acceptable from their standpoint" (p. 
99). The family structure will be as Rawls assumes if women hold no property, but this 
inequality is unlikely to be acceptable to women. A second possibility is to suppose that 
women only care for their daughters, and men for their sons (or vice versa). Third, we might 
have an endogamous family structure, where marriage within the family (between siblings or 
cousins) was encouraged. While such family structures are conceivable and do exist, they do 
not appear to be plausible restrictions to place on the original position.
F igu re  5 . 2 :  R aw lsian  Fam ily S tru c tu re
initial generation is represented by inner circle 
subsequent generations are represented by outer circles 
1, 2 Indicate families.
The Rawlsian family structure is not easily justified. Are there better assumptions to
make about family structure? To answer this question, we turn to Rawls’ description of how
the original position is formulated:
To justify a particular description of the initial situation one shows that it 
incorporates...commonly shared presumptions. One argues from widely 
accepted but weak premises to more specific conclusions. Each of the 
presumptions should by itself be natural and plausible; some of them may 
seem innocuous or even trivial.
The best assumption to make about family structure is the one which seems most natural.
Perhaps the least restrictive assumption to make is that men and women come together and
have children, for which they both feel concern.
Fi gure  5. 3:  Two-sex fami l y s t r u c t u r e
Each household in initial generation (inner circle) 
has two descendants, shown by branches. Each descendant 
forms a new household (outer circle) with "the person 
next door".
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A family structure which satisfies the above description is shown in Figure 5.3.2 In the 
initial generation we have n husband-wife households, shown on the inner circle. Each has 
two children, a boy and a girl. We can arrange the households so that each girl manies "the 
boy next door" to form a new generation of households, shown in the second ring. With a 
husband-wife family structure, households in the initial generation are linked through their 
children’s marriages. The following section explores the consequences of such linkages under 
conditions sufficient to overcome sleeper effects.
53 Irrelevance of Redistribution
When four conditions are satisfied, redistribution of income between linked individuals 
is irrelevant. This is easiest to see for men and women linked by shared concern for their 
children, but is also true for couples connected through their children’s marriage or for two 
individuals linked through a chain of such connections.
The conditions for the irrelevance of redistribution are as follows:
Cl: Each adult makes a strictly positive bequest to his or her descendants.
C2: All adults are concerned about their children.
C3: Adults care about their children's total bequest, not its components.
C4: Each adult’s bequest is determined by rational choice.
It should be noted that condition Cl is stronger than that used in the sleeper effects example 
in that it applies to each individual in a generation.
When conditions C1-C4 are satisfied, small redistributions of wealth between husband and 
wife do not matter. A small change in the wealth distribution can be offset by changes in 
bequests, leaving consumption patterns unchanged. The reasoning is that used in the sleeper
2 Figure 3 is taken from Abel and Bemheim (1988).
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effects example. A redistribution of wealth does not alter the opportunities available to the 
adults. If a certain consumption pattern is the adults’ best choice before any redistribution 
of wealth, it should still be the best choice after the redistribution.3
An example may clarify the argument. Figure 5.4 shows a family composed of two 
adults and a child. The husband has wealth of £8,000, and the wife wealth of £5,000. The 
husband plans to leave £2,000 to his child, consuming £6,000, and the wife plans to leave 
£1,500. Now suppose a tax reform decreases the husband’s wealth to £7,500, and increases 
the wife’s to £6,500 (in the U.K. a change similar in direction to this resulted from the 
conversion of the child tax allowance to child benefit). If the husband decreases his bequest 
to the child by £500, and the wife increases hers by £500, each will be enjoying the same 
level of consumption as before the reform (£6,000, £3,500 and £3,500 for husband, wife, and 
child, respectively). This level of consumption was preferred to the no-adjustment alternative 
(£5,500, £4000 and £3,500) before the reform, so should still be preferred, after the reform. 
The redistribution of wealth through tax reform is offset by changes in bequests.
3 Let the two adults (1 and 2) have utility functions of the form required by condition two: 
Uj-UiXCi,Vl+1 ((l  +rt+1 )bj) where q  is own consumption, bt is the amount bequeathed to 1 and 2’s 
common descendant, where bt=bu  + t^ , the sum of 1 and 2’s individual contributions. The 
contribution bu is determined by rational choice (C4), which requires:
^7 av"1 V
This equation will hold with equality since condition Cl guarantees that we are at an interior solution. 
The conjectured value of 3bj/3b iil may be assumed to be a constant (as it will be under Coumot-Nash 
conjectures, for example). A redistribution of wealth from parent 1 to parent 2 accompanied by an 
equal increase in b^ and decrease in bl t will leave q  and bt unchanged, hence the first order 
conditions will still be maximized - provided that the redistribution is not so large as to force one 
individual to a comer solution.
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Figure 5.4:  An example
* < f  9^£ 8 , 0 0 0  _<£7 f 500>
£6,000 £3,500
£2,000 £1,500
<£1,500> <£2,000>
£ 5, 
<E5,
£3,500
i
000
500>
Initial incomes and contributions are shown without brackets. 
Post-reform incomes and contributions are shown in brackets < >. 
Final consumption levels are underlined.
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The argument that wealth redistribution will be offset by changes in bequests applies 
across households, as well as within households. Bequests to a second generation household 
1^  links two first generation households, say i and i+1, as indicated in Figure 5.3. A small 
redistribution of wealth between the households i and i+1 can be offset by changes in 
bequests to household h  ^ Moreover, it will be offset, as people act to regain their optimal 
consumption/bequest choice.
-E100 +E100 -E100 +£100 -£100 +E100 -£100 +£100 -£100 +E100
Figure 5.5:  Wealth r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  across
househoids .
£100
i
An income t rans f e r  from i to i+5 i s  o f f s e t  by changes 
in bequests .
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By the same line of reasoning, we can argue that small redistributions of wealth (say 
£100) from household i to, say, household i+5, will be irrelevant, as shown in Figure 5.5. 
Suppose that household i decreases its bequest to by £100, and household i+1 switches 
£100 in bequests from K i to 1^ , and so on. The original levels of consumption, which by the 
assumption of rational choice were optimal, will be restored. It is worth noting, however, that 
the decrease in household i's bequest to ^  of £100 cannot occur unless the original bequest 
is at least £100. The same holds for households i+1 through to i+4. By "small" 
redistributions of wealth we mean redistributions which are smaller in size than the smallest 
bequest in the chain of operative linkages.
The linkages created by marriage mean that each person*s level of well-being is a 
function of other people's wealth. Generally, if a person i is one of a group of m connected 
people then his utility, Vi, is given by:
V ^V C k,,...^  5.6
Equation (5.6) holds whenever there are operative links between the m connected people, that 
is, each makes positive bequests (Cl). Abel and Bemheim (1988) show that, if there are no 
frictions in the links between people (C1-C4 hold) consumption, bequests, and utility depend 
on the aggregate wealth of the connected group:
mlq) 5.7
If the whole population is interconnected, individual utility depends on the aggregate capital 
stock, and not upon its distribution between individuals. Distribution is irrelevant.
How large can we expect the groups of interconnected individuals to be? Bemheim and 
Bagwell (1988, p. 322) carried out a Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the probability of 
households being connected. Although they assume random mating, they note that
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even with a near-perfect caste system, it takes only one "intermarriage" to link 
the entire population. In practice, marital links between identifiable 
population subgroups are probably quite common.... As a result, we suspect 
that our assumption [of random mating] is probably innocuous.
They describe their results as follows:
In each simulation, we fixed the number of households (N) in the initial 
generation and, under the assumption that each household produced two 
children, arranged marriages between these children. We then repeated this 
procedure for grandchildren. We took all marriages to be equally likely and, 
in particular, did not rule out marriages between siblings. Out of 100 
simulations with N=20, the population was completely interconnected in 96 
cases. For N=50, the figure was 100 out of 100, and for N=100, it was 98 
out of 100. We also conducted 20 simulations for N=1,000 and found that the 
population was completely interconnected in every case. Furthermore, every 
instance of incomplete interconnection resulted from the existence of a single, 
completely incestuous family (i.e. siblings married siblings in two consecutive 
generations).
Intermarriage links large groups of people either directly or indirectly.
If we imagine a husband-wife family structure, our view of the parties' reasoning in the 
original position must change. Each person in the original position is still behind a veil of 
ignorance. He does not know who his descendants will marry. But he knows that the 
marriage of his descendants will link him to other families and that these links, if certain 
conditions are satisfied, make the small redistributions of wealth within the linked group 
irrelevant.
Conclusions
The irrelevance of redistribution requires each adult in a generation to make positive 
bequests (Cl), whereas overcoming sleeper effects only requires that one individual 
representative of an entire generation makes positive bequests. Condition Cl is stronger than
those Rawls imposes on the original position, and may not be satisfied. Indeed, he recognizes
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the possibility that the less favoured will not take "an active part in the investment process" 
(p. 292).
What if the less favoured do not make positive bequests, whereas wealthier people do? 
The well-being of the better off will depend on the aggregate resources of groups of 
interconnected individuals. That of the less favoured will depend only on their own resources. 
There is no reason for small redistributions of wealth within groups that make positive 
bequests, as such redistribution will be irrelevant A transfer of wealth from a better off 
person to a less favoured person, however, both increases the less favoured person’s wealth, 
and decreases the well-being of all the members of the group with whom the wealthier 
individual is connected. Transfers from the more favoured to the less favoured can reduce 
inequality, and can be justified on equity grounds. Transfers to reduce wealth inequality 
within the group of better off people are irrelevant
In the extreme case when all members of society make positive bequests, individual 
wealth depends on society’s wealth. Decision makers may adopt a maximize total wealth 
rule. Alternatively, the institutions of distributive justice could be retained to make large 
transfers of wealth between individuals, that is, wealth transfers so large that they could not 
be offset by changing bequests.
The irrelevance of redistribution is of interest in part because of what it tells us about the 
structure of Rawls’ theory. The irrelevance result can arise because of idealizations Rawls 
makes. Perfect rationality is an idealization, as is concern for descendants and even mutual 
disinterest. However, despite the many advantages of such idealizations, they may, as O’Neill 
(1988, pp. 5-6) observes, "fail to apply to any significant domain of human choosing". 
Replacing Rawls* idealized family structure with a somewhat more realistic one leads to an
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unrealistic prediction - the irrelevance of redistribution within groups of linked individuals. 
There are ways in which the prediction can be avoided, for example, by admitting that people 
are not perfectly rational or may not be concerned about their descendants. Yet to drop any 
one of the conditions C2-C4 would fundamentally alter Rawls* theory.
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Conclusions
The goal for our study has been to develop models of the family which adhere to 
methodological individualism and to apply the models to government family taxation policy 
and justice between generations. Reflecting upon our models, we may draw conclusions 
about taxation policy, intergenerational justice and methodological individualism.
A government policy on family taxation is unavoidable. No progressive tax system 
can be neutral in its treatment of the family in the sense of treating all families equally 
regardless of the division of labour in the family and, simultaneously, in the sense of 
providing no incentive or disincentive to form families. Neutrality is not a viable policy 
option, and neither ability to pay nor the public interest provide unequivocal grounds for 
adopting particular family policies. In keeping with the welfarist spirit of modem economic 
analysis, however, we may take the relevant aim for policy makers to be to tax the family so 
as to minimize inequality and inefficiency.
Given equity and efficiency goals, our conclusions as to the optimal tax treatment of 
the family depend crucially on how we model the family. We postulated in Chapter 2 first, 
that family decision-making was non-cooperative, second, that spouses cared for each other 
but fell short of perfect altruism, third, that each had (under individual control budget 
constraints) control over their own income, and finally, tliat the benefits from family
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formation took the form of shared public goods consumption. These premises led to the 
conclusions that the level of public goods provision in the household is less than Pareto 
optimal, and that inequality may exist within the family. The results of the optimal tax 
analysis were driven partially by the need to mitigate the under-provision of public goods in 
order to achieve Pareto efficiency. Efficiency could be increased by raising the income of 
the spouse providing household expenditures, either through transfers or through a reduction 
in tax rates. The second factor driving the optimal tax results is equity. Equilibriating the 
well-being of the spouses requires income transfers to the less well-off spouse, or a tax on 
her income, which will induce her to take more leisure.
Moving from a single generation family to one of many generations, we turn to the 
problem of intergenerational justice. Rawls’s (1971) theory of intergenerational justice, like 
in our model of family decision making in Chapter 2, turns on the notion of altruism. 
Altruism, in Rawls* theory, is the altruism of parents for their children, for example, fathers 
care for their sons. We modify Rawls’s theory, in the methodological individualist spirit, to 
allow children have more than one parent and parents have at least one child. Marriage and 
reproduction then leads to complicated patterns of interdependence between members of 
society. Such interdependence, however, contradicts another element of Rawls’s theory, 
namely, the assumption that individuals are in a position of mutual disinterest with respect 
to one another, and casts into doubt the possibility of income redistribution. Rawls’s theory 
is shown to require serious reworking to incorporate families made up of men and women.
The view of the family as a collection of caring but rational individuals does not lead 
to predictions about behaviour as tidy as those of the traditional, single family utility function, 
view. There is a trade-off in modelling between the nearness of results, and the adherence
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to methodological individualism. Individualism can be sacrificed, as is evidenced by 
macroeconomics, which contains many propositions not reducible to individual utility 
maximization. Our objective should be to make the trade-off between elegance and 
individualism thoughtfully. Individualism will receive greater weight in modelling the family 
when, a priori, interactions between family members decisions are expected, for example, in 
modelling labour supply; when the family as a unit is in question, for example, in marriage 
and divorce decisions; and when we are concerned about the distribution of income or well­
being between individual family members, men, women, and children. An economist often 
will not know in advance how strong, say, family ties through intermarriage will be. All we 
can ask, then, is for an individualistic model of the family to be recognized as an ideal, for 
researchers to be aware of intra- and inter-family ties, and to pause and reflect before writing 
down a single family utility function.
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